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PREFACE 
This study is an analytical approach to the issue of taxpayer-
Internal Revenue Service conflict. Specifically, it addresses, from a 
game theory perspective, the area of property valuation disputes in 
estate taxation. The primary objective is to formalize conditions under 
which such disputes will be settled out of court and determine the 
quantitative nature of these settlements. 
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The Valuation Problem in Estate 
and Gift Taxation 
This study applies concepts from the fields of conflict resolution 
and economics to the development of a theory of taxpayer-Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) interaction in estate and gift tax property 
valuation disputes. Heretofore, much has been written about the elusive 
and troublesome valuation issue from an experiential and traditional 
case research perspective but little has been written from the standpoint 
of economic analysis. 
Valuation is inherently a difficult problem. Chambers (1965, p. 43) 
says, "There is no such thing as an inherent or intrinsic value; goods 
have values to persons in specific states at specific times." The 
Internal Revenue Code is imprecise in defining value; Treasury 
Regulations Section 20.2031-l(b) establishes fair market value 
as the standard, defining this concept as "the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Although in the majority of 
instances the hypothetical and conditional character of this definition 
necessarily prevents conclusive determination of value, some sort of 
determination is crucial to the computation of tax liability. Despite 
1 
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some guidelines in the Regulations and previous court cases with respect 
to specific types of property, the valuation problem remains difficult, 
precipitating innumerable disputes involving expenditure of substantial 
resources on both sides. For this reason, both empirical and theoretical 
research are needed to gain a better understanding of the varied aspects 
of the valuation process. 
Valuation strategies are a popular topic at tax practitioner 
seminars and receive thorough coverage in the professional literature. 
Bishop and Rosenbloom (1982), for example, have produced a voluminous 
"digest" of federal tax valuation problems. One commentator (Hartwig, 
1955, p. 1143) notes, "It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that 
the only real problems in estate and gift tax cases which come across 
the average practitioner's desk are valuation problems." He further 
observes: 
Even a superficial consideration . . . of valuation 
problems leads one readily to the conclusion that value is 
essentially a difficult question of fact, prophesy (sic), 
opinion, common sense and informed judgment. A candid 
and experienced practitioner might well characterize 
these impressive terms as pure window-dressing and humbug 
intended to camouflage the irritation and impatience of 
practitioners with a problem which experience has taught 
them boils down to a simple question of 'horse-trading' 
(p. 1144). 
Court decisions in the valuation area have been reported in a vague 
manner (Englebrecht and Davison, 1977) contributing to the aura of 
. d' h' . 1 uncerta1nty surroun 1ng t 1s 1ssue. Descriptions of IRS settlement 
authority (for example, Norwood, Chisholm, Burke, and Vaughan, 1979) and 
anecdotal evidence from attorneys and certified public accountants 
add credence to the notion that an atmosphere of "give and take" 
·characterizes many valuation audits. 
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Toward Increased Understanding 
In light of the above discussion, developments in conflict resolu-
tion research hold promise of providing additional insight into 
taxpayer-IRS interaction; conversely,,,- taxpayer-IRS interaction offers 
--~"':':::_:_~------~---, "- --- --·--- ' - --- ' -
a rich environment for studying and testing propositions of conflict 
resolution theory. The present study explores such interaction; it does 
not attempt to develop new methods for assessing value. 
Modern statistical and computing techniques have enabled researchers 
to move beyond traditional tax research to a systematic identification_ 
and isolation of important factors underlying outcomes of litigated _ 
tax cases. Madeo (1979) achieved some success in statistically dis-
criminating cases won from cases lost by taxpayers in the area of ' 
accumulated earnings. Similarly, Whittington and Whittenburg (1980) 
were able to form rather accurate predictions of the outcomes of debt-_ 
versus-equity cases by using factor and multiple discriminant analysis.' 
These efforts continue to inspire researchers to evaluate the usefulness 
of quantitative as opposed to, or as supplementary to, conventional 
qualitative techniques. 
Englebrecht and Davison (1977) conducted a statistical summary of 
Tax Court decisions in an area where the concept of "winner" and "loser" 
is less clear--that of estate and gift tax valuation of closely-held 
stock. They concluded that, apparently as a product of the inhereny 
ambiguity of the valuation issue, the Tax Court exhibits a tendency tor 
compromise between the value asserted by the taxpayer and that claimedr 
by the Internal Revenue Service. The impression one receives from 
their research is that the taxpayer and the Revenue Service weight the 
application of existing valuation guidelines in order to place themselves 
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in the most favorable positions possible for minimizing and maximizing 
taxes, respectively, while the Tax Court seems to act as a compromiser. 
This suggests a balancing of interests by the Court, which is not new 
to jurisprudence (Rehnquist, 1977; Luizzi, 1980), but which is viewed 
with concern by Englebrecht and Davison in the tax setting. They voice 
a need for "studies examining the human factors' influence on valuation--
both with respect to the litigants and the judges" (Englebrecht and 
Davison, 1977, p. 400). 
That the game-theoretic approach adopted in the present study might 
provide insight is hinted by Eustice (1977, p. 31), "While not exactly_ 
the 'sport of kings,' tax litigation is more often conducted with a level. 
of 'gamesmanship' seldom encountere¢ on the playing fields by even the· 
most energetic sportsmen." The present study offers an economic analysis 
of the inc~ntives and normative behavior of rational disputants in 
estate and gift tax valuation and thereby addresses one important · 
aspect of the "human factors" cited by Englebrecht and Davison. The 
central question is a norm~tive one: given the ambiguity of the 
-------· ~- A •• ••< ·~-- ~ ~ ..<<, A.,.,..... -- ... , ' ' --' ''- ~· •• '·~· '""• .. 4 ~ ...... ,.. ........ , ..... ~ .... ...,.,. •• ,.._,,,........., ......... ~.-----~--.. -,. .......... ~.--..... 
valuation issue, what are the optimal strategies of taxpayer and 
A - -·.....,.., ·~·--- ........................ ......,..,_,.. 
Revenue Service for assigning value in an environment which includes a 
o_. dO ",r ,..,, <•••.,... ,,.~ •. 0 ' ' < .-~.,. •• ~~--- .,.,. ...... ~ .. 
court as a conflict resolution mechanism? Answers to this normative 
question may prove useful in their own right and may lead to some 
positive insights as to ~hy the parties behave as they do. In any,event, 
. the analysis employed reduces the level of detail and focuses on basic 
economic incentives. Thus the analysis formalizes and·adds rigor to-
the study of the vague and confusing valuation issue which consumes SQ 
much time and energy on the part of taxpayers, practitioners and 
government representatives. 
Some questions which the analysis helps to illuminate include the 
following: 
1. If taxpayers and IRS representatives seek to maximize expected 
utility, then how should they deal with the valuation issue? 
2. Is it feasible to predict theoretically the negotiated outcome 
or range of outcomes of a taxpayer-IRS valuation dispute? 
3. Why do negotiations break down in some valuation cases and not 
in others? In other words, what conditions contribute to explaining why 
some valuation cases are settled through the appellate process within 
the Revenue Service while some are not? Can "common sense" explanations 
of this phenomenon be reduced to a few key concepts? 
4. Is the tendency toward compromise valuation on the part of 
the Tax Court, as observed by Englebrecht and Davison (1977), a 
reasonable surrogate for a negotiated outcome? 
5. Are there attributes of court settlements that tend to aggra-
vate conditions of docket congestion? That is, does the observed 
behavior of the court tend to increase its attractiveness to disputants 
as a conflict resolution mechanism? 2 Identification of factors which 
tend to encourage litigation rather than negotiation can suggest 
policies to reduce the impact of those factors. 
Preview of Remaining Chapters 
The next chapter introduces the conflict resolution model used in 
the study. It also specifies the assumptions which will be maintained 
in each of 28 scenarios or settings involving a taxpayer and the 
Revenue Service. Chapters III through VI contain the analyses of the 
28 scenarios, and Chapter VII summarizes the study. 
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ENDNOTES 
1Two notable exceptions are the Bader case (59-1 USTC par. 9431; 
172 F. Supp. 833 (DC Ill.)) and the Central Trust case (62-2 USTC par. 
12.092; 304 F. 2d 923). These cases state specific formulas involving 
earning power, dividend capacity and book value for valuing closely 
held stock. Such formulas are suitable for rapid calculation by 
computer (e.g., Arthur Anderson & Co. (1982)). Although it is not 
clear that the Bader and Central Trust cases have served as effective 
precedents (Englebrecht and Leeson, 1978), they at least attempt to 
reduce uncertainty. 
2According to a report in the May 30, 1984 Wall Street Journal 





This chapter sets the stage for Chapters III through VI, which form 
the core of the study. Assumptions regarding the game situation which 
exists in the taxpayer-IRS setting are stated, along with a summary of 
the basic models being investigated. Additionally, the rationality 
postulates underlying subsequent analysis are listed. 
The Basic Model 
The study uses a theory of conflict resolution to develop optimal 
strategies for the parties to a valuation dispute. Aided by concepts 
from game theory (Luce and Raiffa, 1957), a basic model is formulated 
in which certain primitive assumptions are maintained so as to focus 
on essential economic features of the conflict. Two active participants 
or players are studied--one taxpayer and one Revenue Service representa-
tive or agent. Consistent with other work (for example, Rubin (1977) 
and Schotter (1978)), a third entity, the court, is viewed as a chance 
player, whose valuation decisions represent an exogenous event or 
state of the world which may influence the course of the conflict. 1 
Only fixed threats exist; that is, the payoffs the players receive in 
the absence of an agreement are dictated by the bargaining situation 
7 
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itself, not by any alternative actions the players may take (Harsanyi 
and Selten, 1972). 
The taxpayer and Revenue Service agent are modeled as informed 
persons, aware of the tax law, and both are treated as amoral, 
resourceful, evaluative maximizers of expected utility. A simple, 
single-period world is constructed in which the only operative tax 
issue is valuation. The estate tax (and gift tax) setting, in which the 
taxpayer favors lower values while the Revenue Service agent prefers 
higher values, is the relevant environment, and any estate-tax-income-tax 
tradeoff arising from the basis of property on an estate tax return is 
. d 2 1gnore . These abstractions are consistent with the single-issue 
assumption and at least for litigated cases are an appropriate 
simplification (Englebrecht and Davison, 1977). In fact, the Treasury 
has been criticized as being overly concerned with fiscal matters, 
always fearful of losing revenue (Eustice, 1977). 
A feature of the basic model is the assumption that audit exami-
nations and tax litigation can be conducted without cost. All players 
are assumed to be risk neutral. That is, the players are assumed to 
be interested only in expected values, regardless of risk, in the 
relevant range of outcomes. The assumption that the taxpayer wishes 
to minimize taxes by minimizing value while the agent takes the 
opposite position leads to an expression for the optimal strategy of 
each (for example, the value the taxpayer should place on the tax return, 
whether the agent should audit, the value the agent should claim, and 
whether either party should force litigation). 
Finally, an environment of complete information is assumed in 
the basic model. The players havefull knowledge of the rules of the 
9 
game and each other's utility function. Rules of the game include the 
actions each player may choose at any stage, how much information will 
be available to guide those actions and what the consequences of those 
actions will be for both players (Harsanyi, 1977). In particular, the 
players know the objective probabilities of the possible court decisions, 
implying that the conditions are those of risk rather than uncertainty 
(Harsanyi, 1977). 
Summary of the Models 
After the basic model has been analyzed, several of its primitive 
assumptions are relaxed in a progressive fashion to add further insight 
and enhance realism. The following sequence of situations serves as 
a framework for the project: 
a. Basic Model I (Chapter III). 
1. One taxpayer, with a single item of property to be valued. 
2. One Revenue Service agent. 
3. One court. 
4. Risk neutrality. 
5. Costless auditing. 
6. Costless litigation. 
7. Single filing period. 
8. Complete information. 
b. Basic Model II (Chapter IV). Same as I, with Assumption 
No. 1 relaxed, allowing for more than one taxpayer, still with one 
property each. The Revenue Service agent is assumed to have limited 
resources, enabling him to audit fewer than the full number of returns. 
This raises issues of optimal selection of returns for audit and 
possible changes in taxpayers' strategies in response to a nonzero 
probability of escaping audit. Coalition formation, side-payments 
and communication between taxpayers are assumed impossible. 
c. Basic Model III (Chapter V). Same as I, with Assumption No.8 
relaxed. This means that the players face conditions of uncertainty. 
The taxpayer and agent form subjective and possibly different 
probability distributions for possible court decisions. 
d. Basic Model IV (Chapter VI). Same as II, with Assumption 
No. 8 relaxed. This again replaces risk with uncertainty. 
Within each of these basic models, the fourth, fifth and sixth 
assumptions are relaxed individually and in combination. Each distinct 
combination of assumptions within a basic model is referred to as a 
11 scenario. 11 Figure 1 gives the list of scenarios, which aids in 
following the organization of the study. 
Rationality Postulates 
Background 
Harsanyi (1977) sets forth five postulates of rational behavior 
and three postulates of rational expectations for game situations. 
These postulates form the basis for analysis in this study. Taken 
together, they provide a working definition of rationality. Before 
listing the postulates, a brief explanation of terminology is in -
order. 3 
A game situation is a situation in which the outcome depends on 
interaction between two or more rational players, each pursuing his 
own interests. (This study deals primarily with a two-person game, 
10 
11 
One Risk Costless Costless Complete 
Taxpayer Neutrality Auditing Litigation Information 
81 X X X X X 
S2 X X X X 
83 X X X X 
84 X X X 
85 X X X X 
S6 X X X 
87 X X 
S8 X X X X 
89 X X X 
810 X X X 
Sll X X 
812 X X X 
813 X X 
814 X 
815 X X X X 
816 X X X 
817 X X X 
818 X X 
819 X X X 
820 X X 
821 X 
822 X X X 
823 X X 
824 X X 
825 X 
826 X X 
827 X 
828 
X--Indicates assumption maintained in scenario 
Figure 1. List of Scenarios 
but the theory of games has been extended to situations involving more 
than two players.) Each player is assumed to behave as if he assigned 
a numerical utility or payoff to each possible physical outcome, 
according to a certain utility function. The greater the payoff the 
more the player prefers a particular outcome. 
At a particular stage of a game a player may have several alter-
native courses of action available; these are called choices. A full 
description of which choice a player would make at every possible stage 
is called a strategy. Thus a strategy (or pure strategy) consists of a 
sequence of choices. A set of strategies containing exactly one 
strategy for each of two or more players is called a joint strategy. 
(In the case of two players, a joint strategy is sometimes referred to 
as a strategy pair.) 
The rules of the game, as noted previously, specify the actions 
each player can take, the amount of information he will have available 
and the consequences of his actions for all players. Technically a 
game is a game situation with fully specified rules. A stochastic 
event influencing the course of the game may be modeled as a set of 
alternative choices of an imaginary chance player. The rules of the 
game must specify the probability distribution over alternative 
outcomes of this chance event. (For example, nature could be treated 
as a chance player, with "rain" and "shine" being two alternative 
12 
states of nature, having respective probabilities of, say, 0.2 and 0.8.) 
The strategies selected by the players determine the outcome of the 
game and their utility functions determine their payoffs. (Of course, 
if there is a chance event in the game, the strategies chosen by the 
human players determine only probability distributions over payoffs.) 
Now, in a two-person game, if the strategy s~ gives player i 
1. 
(i = 1,2) the greatest payoff of all available strategies when player 
j (j = 1,2; j ~ i) uses strategy s.' 
J 
then s~ is said to be player i's 
1. 
best reply to s .. Player i's best reply to a given strategy s. of 
J J 
player j is not necessarily unique; if it is unique, it is called 
player i's only best reply to s .. A set of strategies in which every 
J 
strategy is a best reply to the strategy (combination) of the remaining 
player(s) is called an equilibrium point. 
If player i has no definite expectation about the strategy player 
j will use but can form only a subjective probability distribution over 
all possible strategies of player j, the strategy s~ yielding the 
. 1. 
highest payoff on average (based on the mean of the subjective 
probability distribution over player j's strategies) is called player 
i's subjective best reply to player j's expected mean strategy. 
Assume that player i uses strategy s .. 
1. 
Then the lowest payoff 
he can obtain, regardless of the strategy employed by player j, is 
called player i's security level for strategy s .. The highest 
1. 
security level player i can obtain with any strategy s. is called 
1. 
player i's maximin payoff. A player can be assured of receiving at 
least his maximin payoff; moreover, it is the highest payoff he can 
count on receiving (though in a given game it might be possible to 
receive a higher payoff). Any strategy having the maximin payoff as 
its security level is called a maximin strategy. A game in which a 
player cannot rationally expect to receive more than his maximin payoff 
is said to be unprofitable to that player; all other games are said to 
be profitable to the player. 
13 
Game theorists have found it useful to assume that every game is 
preceded by a bargaining game, in which the players make offers in an 
attempt to agree on their strategies for the main game and hence their 
payoffs from the main game. It is bargaining games which are of 
interest in the current study. A player's strategy in a bargaining 
game is called a bargaining strategy, and it consists of a decision 
rule which tells the player whether (1) to make a concession (that is, 
to accept a lower payoff than previously demanded) or (2) to insist on 
his last offer. 
It is now possible to list the rationality postulates paraphrased 
from Harsanyi (1977) and adapted to the two-person situation. 
The Postulates 
14 
Al. Maximin postulate. In any game unprofitable to a given player, 
that player should always use a maximin strategy. (If one cannot 
expect to receive more than his maximin payoff, then he should use a 
strategy which assures at least that much.) 
A2. Best-reply postulate. In any game profitable to a given 
player, that player should always use a best-reply strategy to the 
strategy of the other player, to the extent any binding agreements 
between the players allow. 
A3. Subjective-best-reply postulate (Bayesian expected-utility 
maximization postulate). In a bargaining game associated with a game 
profitable to a given player, that player should always use a bargaining 
strategy which is a subjective best reply to the expected mean strategy 
of the other player. (In general, in a bargaining game a player cannot 
definitely predict the other player's bargaining strategy and therefore 
cannot be expected to identify an actual best-reply strategy as in 
postulate A2.) 
15 
A4. Acceptance-of-higher-payoffs postulate. (1) In the course of 
a bargaining game, if a given player is willing to agree to a joint 
strategy s for the main game, then he must be even more willing to agree 
to another joint strategy s* which yields a higher payoff. (2) In a 
bargaining game if, lacking any special agreement to the contrary, both 
players would use a joint bargaining strategy (b 1,b 2), then player i 
(i = 1,2) must be willing to enter into an agreement whereby both 
players will shift to a joint bargaining strategy (b!,b~) yielding 
player i a higher payoff. 
AS. Equiprobability postulate. Given a set of alternative 
strategies, all equally consistent with the other rationality 
postulates and all expected to yield the same payoff, a player will 
be equally likely to use any particular strategy in the set. 
The three postulates which follow are postulates of rational 
expectations. 
B1. Mutually expected-rationality postulate. A rational player 
(that is, one who follows these eight rationality postulates) must 
expect, and act on the expectation, that the other player will also 
conform to the rationality postulates. 
B2. Symmetric-expectations postulate. A player cannot choose a 
bargaining strategy on the expectation that a rational opponent will 
choose a different bargaining strategy and, in particular, that he will 
choose a more concessive strategy. (In other words, player i cannot 
expect palyer j, who is equally rational, to behave more concessively 
than player i would in the same situation.) 
16 
B3. Expected-independence-of-irrelevant-variables postulate. A 
player cannot expect a rational opponent to make his bargaining strategy 
dependent on variables whose relevance to bargaining decisions cannot 
be established on the basis of these rationality postulates. This rules 
out some completely extraneous, arbitrary decision rules that might be 
consistent with the other postulates but lack any demonstrable connection 
with expected utility maximization. 
Summary 
This chapter has introduced the basic models and their assumptions 
and has outlined the structure of the remaining chapters. A brief 
discussion of some fundamental game theory concepts led into a 
specification of the postulates which are assumed to guide the behavior 
of rational individuals in an interactive setting. In the next chapter, 
Basic Model I is presented. 
ENDNOTES 
1Posner (1972, 1973) internalizes the court decision as an 
endogenous function of the two parties' legal expenditures but is 
unable to find what he considers to be a satisfactory way to avoid 
making arbitrary assumptions about their reaction patterns to changes 
in each other's level of expenditures. 
2It could be assumed that the Revenue agent is compensated by a 
principal (the "government") as an increasing function of the tax "won" 
from the taxpayer, net of any costs incurred in auditing and litigating. 
Although this is not empirically the case, it would tend to encourage 
behavior such as that exhibited by IRS representatives in contested 
valuation cases. Such an assumption about an incentive function would 
not alter the results in this study if one assumes fixed audit and 
litigation costs and hence a one-to-one functional relationship between 
the agent's compensation and the value of the property in question. 
(An agency theory approach to the study of incentive contracts for IRS 
representatives could form the basis of an interesting related study.) 
3 Chapters 5 and 6 of Harsanyi (1977) provide detailed discussions 
of these concepts. 
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CHAPTER III 
BASIC MODEL I 
One Taxpayer, Complete Information 
Overview 
This chapter explores, in seven progressively complex scenarios, 
the implications of alternative sets of assumptions for taxpayer-IRS 
behavior in valuation disputes. It is assumed throughout that both 
parties have complete information about the situation and that there 
is only one taxpayer. The primary issues addressed are (1) the effects 
of litigation costs, audit costs and risk aversion on the decision to 
litigate or settle out of court and (2) the nature of any negotiated 
settlement. Numerical examples are included to illustrate selected 
results. 
All Assumptions in Place (S1) 
In this simplest setting it is assumed that the taxpayer (T) and 
the Revenue Service agent (R) are risk neutral and possess complete 
information. There are no direct costs of auditing or litigating (for 
example, attorney fees, lost time) to either party. Filing of the tax 
return is a one-time event; no past, future or other contemporaneous 
returns are considered. 
18 
The court-determined value is viewed as a random variable VC, 
distributed according to some known probability density function, 
independent of the values claimed by the litigants but limited by the 
"facts of the case" to some range between a minimum value v . and a 
m1n 
maximum value v max Thus the possible outcomes consist of the finite 
set of whole-cent amounts in the closed interval [v . , v ], with m1n max 
v . > 0. Plausible arguments can be formulated to support any value m1n -
within this range. 
19 
For example, an estate might contend that the decendent's management 
services were indispensable to a closely-held corporation so that shares 
in that corporation reported on the return were of little value on 
the date of death or alternate valuation date. A survey of Internal 
Revenue Code Section 2031(a) on value of property in general, Section 
2031(b) and Revenue Ruling 59-60 on unlisted stock, Treasury Regulations 
Section 20.2031-1(b) on "fair market value," textbooks and handbooks 
(such as Stephens, Maxfield, and Lind (1978) and Hoffman (1982)) suggests 
that the range of possible values is narrower for some types of assets 
than for others. It is usually easier to establish a reasonable 
range of values for an automobile than for an original art object or 
stock in a close corporation. Englebrecht and Davison (1977) cite a 
case in which the taxpayer's three expert witnesses valued the same 
closely-held stock at $822., $980, and $1,320 per share while the 
Service produced two experts who valued the stock at $3,400 and $4,000 
per share. The court finally returned a value of $2,200 per share. 
The present analysis applies to any situation in which the Code and 
Regulations fail to pinpoint value (that is, virtually all cases where 
there is no observable market price) but is especially important in 
the many instances in which the difference between v . and v is 
m1n max 
"large." At best, application of guidelines to the facts of a case can 
determine a reasonable v . and v 
m1n max 
Although "facts" will naturally 
be cited to support any particular position, the absence of specific 
formulas, procedures and weights for relevant factors (Englebrecht and 
Jamison, 1979; Boatsman and Baskin, 1981) means that both disputants 
can support any value they wish between v . and v . . m1n max 
The taxpayer returns (reports on the tax return) a value vT, 
resulting in a tax tvT, there t is the tax rate, which is assumed 
constant. The agent, observing vT, decides whether to audit the return 
and assert a value vR > vT or to accept vT as filed. Should the agent 
assert vR, negotiations are permitted, allowing for the possibility of 
an out-of-court settlement. 1 Failure of negotiations to produce a 
settlement results in litigation--the bargainers do not simply walk 
away in a "no-trade" outcome. 
Observe that this is a two-person, constant-sum game; the tax one 
player loses the other gains. The players are strict adversaries. 
They have strictly opposite interests, making this a noncooperative 
game (Harsanyi, 1977). Figure 2 illustrates the extensive form or game 
tree representation of the game, where the risk-neutrality assumption 
20 
permits expression of payoffs or utilities in terms of money. Figure 3 
illustrates the normal form, from which the maximin solution is evident. 2 
Use of maximin strategies by both players leads to auditing by 
the agent and nonacquiescence by the taxpayer, resulting in litigation. 
Obviously, in this simple scenario, there is no economic incentive to 
litigate or not to litigate, provided negotiations produce a settlement 
equal to the jointly held expectation E(VC). Equivalently, there is no 
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reason for negotiations to fail to produce such a settlement since 
neither party expects to obtain a more favorable result by litigating. 
~ 
Thus the players should arrive at a settlement equal to E(VC) or go to 
3 court and obtain a value vC (not necessarily equal to E(VC), of course). 
It is clear that the existence of the court drives the litigants' 
behavior; the court either will decide the case directly or will 
provide the basis for a negotiated settlement. 
Revenue Agent's Pure Strategies 
Accept vR 
Litigate 
Figure 3. Normal Form 
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Example. Suppose the possible values of a certain asset in an 
estate are $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, and $6, depending on how one weights 
various valuation factors mentioned in the Code, Regulations, previous 
cases and other available guidance. The taxpayer favors a value of $1 
while the agent prefers a value of $6. The court, if used, will decide 
the case by rolling a fair die and selecting the value which turns up. 
Both parties are aware of this uniform distribution and will compute the 
expected value E(VC) = $3.50. Neither expects to achieve a more 
favorable solution than $3.50 by litigating, and they are both risk 
neutral, so $3.50 is the certainty equiv~lent of a litigated solution. 
Both would be indifferent between settling on a value of $3.50 and 
litigating. The maximin postulate implies that neither would accept 
a less favorable settlement, and the mutually-expected-rationality and 
symmetric-expectations postulates imply that neither can expect the 
other to do so. In the language of the next scenario (S2), the value 
$3.50 is the only point which satisfies both the individual rationality 
and joint rationality conditions. 
Costly Litigation (S2) 
Relax the costless litigation assumption, allowing for fixed costs 
LT and LR. Intuitively, these costs create an incentive to settle out 
of court. Analysi~ of the situation in light of postulates of rational 
· behavior and rational expectations yields the same conclusion but 
proceeds even further by specifying a determinate bargaining outcome 
from two different perspectives. 
Classical economic theory proposes the following rationality 
requirements for a bargaining solution (Harsanyi, 1977). 
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1. Individual rationality. The solution must provide payoffs to 
both players at least as favorable as those that are obtainable if 
negotiations break down (the conflict payoffs). In the present context, 
a rational player would not accept a negotiated value if he expected 
to fare better by litigating. In Figure 4, if the origin represents 
the conflict payoffs, and if the achievable payoff combinations are 
those within the triangular area AOB, then a bargained outcome must 
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Taxpayer's Utility 
Figure 4. Payoff Space 
2. Joint rationality or joint efficiency. The settlement cannot 
be improved upon for both players simultaneously. In the present 
context, the taxpayer and agent would not agree to a value if there is 
an available alternative that would increase the utility of both. 
In Figure 4, this means that the agreement must lie on the upper right-
hand boundary, AB. 
Note that any costlessly negotiated agreement is efficient in 
the sense of the joint efficiency requirement; any alternative would 
reduce the payoff to either the taxpayer or the agent. 
The individual rationality requirement implies that the taxpayer 
will not accept a negotiated value v unless the tax t •v is less than the 
expected outlay associated with litigation, tE(VC) +LT. Likewise, the 
agent will not accept a negotiated value v unless the tax t•v is at 
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least as great as the expected net proceeds from litigation, tE(VC) - LR. 
In summary, a negotiated value v must produce a tax which satisfies 
(1) 
In terms of value, dividing by t yields 
E(VC) 
LR LT 
(2) -- < v < E(V ) +-t - - c t 
Any value within the negotiation set specified by (2) is a potential 
settlement point. The key concept here is that the two parties may 
cooperate in order to avoid litigation costs. Any negotiated outcome 
within the negotiation set represents an allocation of the joint 
benefit of the saved litigation costs. 
Harsanyi (1977) discusses two perspectives from which bargaining 
theorists have approached the problem of finding a determinate solution 
within the negotiation set. Nash's model, published in 1950, corresponds 
to the normal form of the bargaining game, specifying a solution without 
addressing the process or series of mutual concessions by which the 
solution might obtain. On the other hand, Zeuthen's earlier bargaining 
model, reported in 1930, corresponds to the extensive form of the 
bargaining game and does supply a description of how the bargaining 
process may unfold. It has been shown that the Nash and Zeuthen 
approaches, though very different, are mathematically equivalent; 
moreover, Harsanyi has shown that the choice rule which Zeuthen stated 
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a priori for deciding whether to make a bargaining concession actually 
follows from rationality postulates A3, A4, B1, B2, and B3 in Chapter II 
of this study. 
Nash (1930) showed that for rational bargainers an agreement 
point exists and is unique. Furthermore, it can be identified as 
that point v* which maximizes the Nash product (as applied to the 
taxpayer-Revenue agent setting) 
where c is the expected conflict outcome or court outcome which would 
occur in the absence of a settlement. 4 
In the present scenario, with risk neutrality, the utilities 
attached to a particular value v may be expressed in terms of dollars 
paid or received: 
(The minus sign reflects a cash outflow on the part of the taxpayer--
utility decreases as value increases.) The utilities associated with 




To find the v* which maximizes (3), expand the expression as 
follows: 
Differentiating with respect to v and setting the derivative equal 
to zero yields 
So 
v* = (4) 
2 Observe that N"(v) = -2t , which is always negative. Thus v* in (4) 
represents the value of v which maximizes the Nash product N(v). 
Example. Let E(VC) = $150, LT = $20, LR = $10 and t = 0.2. Then 
the negotiation set identified by inequality (2) is $100 ~ v ~ $250. 
That is, both parties would rather secure an agreement on the disputed 
value between $100 and $250 than go to court. This is evident from 
Table I. The taxpayer would not agree to a value higher than $250 
(tax of $50) while the agent would not agree to a value lower than 
$100 (tax of $20) because these payoffs are expected to be available 
through litigation. The third column of the table shows the result of 
the linear transformations U~(v) = UT(v) + tE(VC) + LT and U~(v) = 
UR(v) - tE(VC) + LR~ which translate the conflict point to (O~O). 
These transformations reveal the allocation of the saved litigation 
costs~ a total of $30, effected by each potential settlement. An 
agreement setting v = $100 would permit the taxpayer to capture the 
entire $30 cost saving, while a settlement with v = $250 would shift 
the full benefit to the Revenue agent. 
TABLE I 
SOME POTENTIAL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS 
Allocation of 
(uT~~) = (-.2v,.2v) Saved Costs v (u~~~) 
$100 (-$20, $20) ($30, $ 0) 
110 (- 22, 22) ( 28, 2) 
140 (- 28, 28) ( 22, 8) 
150 (- 30, 30) ( 20, 10) 
160 (- 32, 32) ( 18, 12) 
175 (- 35, 35) ( 15, 15) 
200 (- 40~ 40) ( 10' 20) 
250 (- 50, 50) ( 0, 30) 
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It is interesting to note that the Nash solution, v* = $175, 
allocates the cost saving equally--$15 to each player. Because in this 
example the respective litigation costs, LT = $20 and LR = $10, are 
unequal, the Revenue agent captures $5 of the taxpayer's savings. In 
general, the player,with greater litigation costs in such a setting 
has more to lose by litigating and will therefore have to behave more 
. 1 5 concess1ve y. Only if LT and LR were equal would the Nash solution 
equal the expected court value E(VC). Equivalently, only if LT and LR 
were equal would E(VC) be the midpoint of the negotiation set. 
Zeuthen (Harsanyi, 1977) ·models the bargaining process as a succession 
of stages. 
k 
Assume that at stage k the taxpayer has proposed vT and 
k the Revenue agent has proposed vR as the value of the property. The 
taxpayer would prefer his own offer to that of the agent but would 
prefer either offer to the conflict situation, which entails litigation 
costs. Analogously, the agent would prefer his own proposal to that 
of the taxpayer but views either as superior to litigation. Thus 
and 
Consider a simplified bargaining situation in which each player is 
restricted to a choice between full insistence on his own last · 
proposal and full acceptance of his opponent's last proposal (Harsanyi, 
1977). Zeuthen uses this simplified setting to derive a measure of 
each player's willingness to risk a conflict and uses this measure to 
identify the player who will have to make the next concession. 
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To develop Zeuthen's measure, assume that the taxpayer, T, 
assigns the subjective probability pRT to the event that the Revenue 
agent, R, will refuse to concede. Then the subjective probability 
which T assigns to the event that R will fully concede is 1 - pRT" 
Now, if T fully concedes, assume he will obtain the payoff UT(vR) with 
certainty; but, if T refuses to concede, he may obtain the superior 
payoff UT(vT) or the inferior payoff UT(c), depending on R's choice 
of whether to concede or hold out, respectively. 
In order to maximize expected utility, T will compare the expected 
utility of holding out against the utility of accepting R's last offer. 
That is, T will choose to hold out only if 
Expected utility of holding out~ Utility of R's last offer 
By rearranging terms, this condition becomes 
30 
(5) 
The fraction on the right-hand side in (5) is called T's risk limit, rT. 
It represents a ceiling on the subjective probability pRT of a conflict 
that T would be willing to face in order to obtain an agreement on his 
own terms as opposed toR's last proposal. Any higher value of pRT 
would lead T to accept vR. The greater rT is, the greater T's 
incentive to risk a conflict rather than accept R's last offer. 
Thus rT measures the taxpayer's willingness to risk a conflict. 
All the foregoing discussion applies with the subscripts R and T 
reversed. Moreover, in the complete information setting, both players 
know each other's r value as well as their own, leading to what 
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Harsanyi (1977) calls "psychological pressure" on the one with the lower 
r value to make the next concession. 
Zeuthen's Principle (Harsanyi, 1977), adapted to the taxpayer-
Revenue agent setting, states that 
1. If rT > rR, then the Revenue agent must make the next concession; 
2. If rT < rR, then the taxpayer must make the next concession; and 
3. If rT = rR, then both parties must make a concession. 
The important point is not how large the concessions are but who 
makes them at each stage; as long as Zeuthen's Principle is followed, 
the same ultimate outcome will result, namely, the Nash solution. It is 
Zeuthen's Principle which Harsanyi (1977), as mentioned earlier, has 
6 shown to follow from the rationality postulates. Zeuthen had accepted 
it on the basis of its plausibility. 
Example. As in the preceding example, let E(VC) = $150, LT = $20, 
L = $10 and t = 0.2. For convenience, use the transformed utility 
R 
functions U~(v) = UT(v) + tE(VC) +LT (that is, U~(v) = -.2v + 50) and 
U~(v) = UR(v) - tE(VC) + LR (that is, U~(v) = .2v - 20). Under these 
transformations, U~(c) = UT(c) + SO = -50 + SO = 0, and U~(c) = UR(c) -
20 = 20 - 20 = 0. Thus 
U~(vT) - U~(vR) 
rT U~(vT) 
and 
Now suppose T proposes vT = $100 and R proposes vR = $250. Then 
(50 - .2(100)) - (SO - .2(250)) 
so - .2(100) 1 
and 
= (.2(250) - 20) - (.2(100) - 20) 
.2(250) - 20 
1 
This indicates that both should make concessions. 
Suppose vT = $110, vR = $245. Then rT = 0.9643 and rR = 0.9655. 
Since rT < rR, the taxpayer should make the next concession. 
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Luce and Raiffa (1957) observe that the Nash solution is equivalent 
to the two-person Shapley Value. Of the $30 joint benefit of cooperation 
in the example, the Shapley allocation to the taxpayer is the average 
of (a) the amount of total litigation cost he can definitely save 
noncooperatively ($0) and (b) the marginal amount ($30 - $0 = $30) he 
contributes by cooperating with the Revenue agent (where the $0 in the 
preceding parenthetical computation reflects the amount of joint cost 
R can save noncooperatively). The analogous computation yields the 
Shapley allocation to the agent. As in the Nash model, each player 
realizes $15 of the total cost savings. 
It should be noted that policy prohibits the IRS from explicitly 
considering court costs when forming a decision on whether to allow a 
case to go to court. This may have the artificial effect of setting 
LR = 0 in both parties' decision models. The model implies that this 
will tend to make the Service less concessive in negotiations, to its 
own economic detriment (at least from a single-period, single-taxpayer 
perspective). On the other hand, the IRS does desire to limit the 
number of cases it litigates and therefore implicitly considers some 
type of court cost, perhaps nonpecuniary in nature. 
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Risk Aversion (S3) 
In relaxing the risk-neutrality assumption, the most reasonable 
alternative is to assume that at least one of the parties is risk 
averse. The assumption of complete information remains in place in 
this scenario; the parties' subjective probability assessments coincide 
with the objective distribution of the court decision. Litigation is 
assumed costless in order to focus on the effect of risk aversion. 
The taxpayer would just be willing to pay with certainty some tax 
CET (certainty equivalent) greater than tE(VC) in order to avoid the 
risk associated with the court decision. Similarly, a risk-averse 
Revenue agent would just be willing to accept with certainty some tax 
CER less than tE(VC) to avoid the risk associated with the court action. 
In summary, CER < tE(VC) < CET. 
Thus, even in the absence of litigation costs, an incentive exists 
for negotiating. The negotiation set is defined by the possible 
settlements which produce a tax within the closed interval [CER, CET]. 
Points in the negotiation set satisfy the individual and joint 
rationality conditions discussed in scenario S2. Clearly the negotia-
tion set will be skewed in monetary terms in favor of the party who is 
less risk averse. 
Example. Assume the taxpayer exhibits constant risk aversion and 
that the Revenue agent is risk neutral .. The taxpayer's utility for a 
cash outflow of x dollars is UT(x) = 
X 
-e , while the agent's utility is 
X Observe that U~(x) = -e < 0, indicating decreasing utility 
for tax. Also, U"(x) = -ex < 0, indicating risk aversion. T 
The risk 




so the taxpayer is constantly risk averse (Keeney and Raiffa, p. 186). 
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Now assume that the random variable VC (the court decision) follows 
a uniform distribution, resulting in a tax between tv . and tv 
m~n max 
To simplify notation, let a = tv . and b = tv 
m~n max 




J X -e 
a 
b a 





a - b 
litigating the uncertain 
dx 
Then the expected 
tax X is c 
To find the certainty equivalent tax, find the tax x which provides the 
same amount of utility as the expected utility of the litigation lottery: 
set UT(x) E(UT(Xc)) 
A b a 
X e - e -e b a -
b a 
A ln (e - e ) X = b - a 
10 
F · 0 db 10 Then xA -- ln (e 10- 1) -- $7.70. or ~nstance, suppose a = an = . 
So the taxpayer in this case would be willing to pay as much as $7.70 
in tax for certain rather than litigate (where the expected outcome is 
a tax of only $5 but is risky). 




1 x -- dx 
b-a 
a + b 
2 
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But this is just the expected court award so, as is characteristic 
of risk neutrality, CER = E(Xc). If a= 0 and b = 10, then CER = 5. 
The negotiation set in this example, then, is [5, 7.70]. Each 
party is aware of this and should attempt to obtain concessions from 
the other. The Nash product, in terms of tax, is 
b a 
= (-ex_ e - e )(x _a+ b) 
a-b 2 
Differentiating and setting N'(c) 0 yields 
b a 
ex( a + b _ x _ 1) _ e - e . = 0 
2 a-b 
For a= 0 and b = 10, the above gives a Nash solution of x = $6.70. Thus 
the Revenue agent in this example is able to exploit the taxpayer's 
risk aversion to obtain a negotiated tax which is 34 percent greater 
than the mutually expected court award. 
Risk Aversion and Costly Litigation (S4) 
This scenario combines the two aspects of a court solution just 
discussed--costs and risk. The former creates an incentive to settle 
out of court, as does the latter, for risk-averse players. These 
incentives manifest themselves as a negotiation set--a range of possible 
settlements which both parties would prefer to litigation. Which, if 
any, of these settlements will actually obtain depends on interaction 
of the two players. The Nash bargaining solution concept from game 
theory suggests that the settlement should be that which maximizes 
the product of the players' utilities (net of the respective conflict 
payoffs which each expects in the absence of agreement). 
The essential difference between the present situation and the two 
preceding scenarios lies in a widening of the negotiation set. In the 
case of risk aversion without litigation costs, the negotiation set was 
[CER, CET]. Introduction of litigation costs LT and LR broadens this 
interval to [CER, CE~], where CER is the Revenue agent's certainty 
equivalent for the litigation lottery, with cost LR deducted from each 
consequence, and where CE~ is the taxpayer's certainty equivalent with 
LT added to each consequence of the lottery. 
Proposition. Under the assumptions of scenario S4, the following 
are true: 
a. CER < CER 
b. CE~ > CET 
Proof. 
a. C~R is that tax XR such that 
where Xc is the court-determined tax. Likewise, CER is that tax ~ 
such that 
But subtracting the constant LR makes E(UT(Xc- LR)) < E(UT(Xc)), so 
UR(XR) < UR(~). Since URis monotonically increasing, XR < xR' as 
claimed. 
b. CE' is that tax A' such that 
T ~ 
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Similarly, CET is that tax xT such that 
But E(UT(Xc + LT)) < E(UT(Xc)) since the taxpayer's utility decreases 
with cash outflow. Therefore, UT(x~) < UT(xT) and by the monotonically 
d • t f u Af > A 1 • d ecreas1ng proper y o T' xT . xT, as c a1me . 
The foregoing proposition asserts that the negotiation set expands 
when nonzero litigation costs are included in the risk averse model. 
As the following example illustrates, the expansion is additive and 
linear in nature in the special case where a player exhibits constant 
risk aversion (that is, has an exponential utility function) or is 
risk neutral. 7 
Example. Assume the taxpayer is risk averse and the Revenue agent 
is risk neutral. UT(x) = -ex and UR(x) = x, as in the preceding 
example. In addition, the parties incur fixed litigation costs LT and 
LR with certainty if the court is used. 
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The taxpayer's expected utility for a uniformly distributed, court-
decreed tax Xc' plus constant litigation cost LT, is 
1 dx 
b-a 
where a and b are as in the preceding example. This reduces to 
Setting UT(x) = E(UT(Xc + LT)) to find the certainty equivalent, 




= L + ln( e - e ) X T b-a 
Notice that this is equal to LT + CET if CET represents the certainty 
equivalent computed without litigation costs. For instance, if a = 0 
and b = 10, with LT = 2, x = 2 + 7.70 = $9.70. 
Now, for the.Revenue agent, the expected utility of litigation is 
b 




Notice that if CER represents the certainty equivalent in the costless 
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litigation case, the new certainty equivalent is CER- LR. For instance, 
if a= 0 and b = 10, with LR = 1, the Revenue agent's certainty 
equivalent is 5 - 1 = $4. 
The negotiation set in this numerical example is [4, 9.70], as 
compared with [5, 7.70] in the costless litigation case. Litigation 
costs skew the negotiation set in favor of the player with the smaller 
litigation costs. 
The Nash product here is 
LT b 
N(x) = ( x e (e - ea) )(x _ ( a+b L_)) 
-e "'7" a-b -2- - ~ 
Differentiating and setting N'(x) = 0 results in the equation 
LT b 
= ..:;;e_~( e;;_,._-__;;;;e_a)f... 
a-b 
If a = 0, b = 10, LR = 1 and LT = 2, the Nash solution is x = $8.07, 
as compared to $6.70 in the costless litigation case. Here the Revenue 
agent is able to obtain additional tax as a result of the taxpayer's 
greater litigation costs. 
Costly Auditing (SS) 
Although unrealistic, it is instructive to assume for the moment 
that the tax return examination process is costly to both parties but 
that litigation is not. This focuses attention on the manner in which 
communication arrangements affect the situation. Certainly pre-audit 
communication is different from that which occurs during an audit and 
subsequent pre-trial negotiations. Consideration of a pre-audit stage 
distinguishes the present study from previous work on out-of-court 
settlement such as Posner (1973), Rubin (1977), and Gould (1973) and 
economic analyses of labor-management negotiations such as those by 
Farber and Katz (1979) and Bloom (1981). Those studies do not address 
a possible pre-negotiation. stage. 
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Assume fixed audit costs AT and ~ are incurred with certainty in 
the event of an audit. ~here are no litigation costs. If the value 
returned by the taxpayer is unsatisfactory to the Revenue Service agent, 
a conflict situation (audit) arises. (In scenarios with litigation 
costs and/or risk aversion, the notion of a conflict applies to litiga-
tion. Here, however, where litigation is costless and the players are 
risk neutral with homogeneous expectations, neither player can inflict 
further damage on the other.once audit costs have been incurred. The 
audit costs become sunk costs at that point.) 
When the taxpayer files his return in this scenario, he irrevocably 
commits himself to accepting a particular value vT and concomitant tax 
tvT. The return-filing procedure serves to inform the Revenue Service 
agent of this fact before the agent has selected his own demand. The 
taxpayer's commitment is irrevocable and constitutes an ultimatum in 
that the agent has a choice only between a conflict (audit) and full 
acceptance of vT. He can challenge vT only by paying ~ to audit. 
Harsanyi (1977) calls such a situation an ultimatum game. Empirically, 
ultimatum games are unusual. They can occur between two rational 
players only if the communication facilities are strongly biased in 
favor of one of the players. This is the situation which exists in a 
"voluntary" self-assessment system of tax compliance. The Revenue 
Service normally becomes aware of an estate or gift tax liability only 
when a return is filed. 
~ 
The outcome of an ultimatum game differs from that of an ordinary 
bargaining game. In the ordinary bargaining games of scenarios S2, 
S3, and S4, the solution tended to lie reasonably near the center of 
the negotiation set. The more similar the two players' risk and cost 
profiles, the stronger this tendency. However, the solution of an 
ultimatum game lies close to an end point of the negotiation set. In 
the present scenario, the taxpayer will set his "ultimatum value" vT 
such that tvT = tE(Vc) - ~ + E, where the E represents any nominal 
amount, say $0.01. This ultimatum value is essentially equal to the 
Revenue Service agent's concession limit. 
Example. Let~ = $3, ~ = $4, t = 20% and E(Vc) = $150. 
Litigation is costless. Then the apparent negotiation set in terms 
of cash flows is [tE(Vc) - ~' tE(Vc) +AT], which in this example is 
[26, 33]. Both players would prefer any settlement in the interior 
of this interval to going through an audit and arriving at a settlement 




initiative, he can set vT so that tvT lies just above the agent's 
concession limit of $26, say vT = $130.05 (making tvT = $26.01). It 
would then be irrational in this one-period world for the agent to audit 
because the best payoff he can expect to net from that course of action 
is tE(Vc) - ~ = $26. Auditing would not allow him to obtain a more 
favorable settlement from the taxpayer, whose audit cost would then 
become a sunk cost. 
Costly Auditing and Costly Litigation (S6) 
When litigation costs are reintroduced into the model in conjunction 
with audit costs, two levels of conflict emerge. The occurrence of an 
audit is one level of conflict situation--outcomes for both players are 
reduced by their respective audit costs, which would have been avoidable 
if the taxpayer had returned a value satisfactory to the agent. The 
second level of conflict situation is litigation, with its attendant 
costs and risks--the result of failure to reach a negotiated settlement. 
Because the taxpayer communicates his demand vT first and since the 
agent must either accept vT or force the first level of conflict (audit), 
an ultimatum game exists in this scenario. However, if an audit were 
to occur, the game would become an ordinary bargaining game from that 
point on. Audit costs would then become sunk costs, and the two players 
would negotiate the Nash solution v* based solely on the expected court 
decision and their respective litigation costs, as in scenario S2. 
Now, because the Revenue Service agent can always achieve the Nash 
solution (Harsanyi, 1977), his concession limit with respect to the 
initial value vT is tv* - ~· That is, the agent will audit if and 
only if tv < tv* -T ~- Comparison with the preceding scenario reveals 
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that the tax based on the Nash value has replaced that based on the 
expected court-determined value alone in the agent's concession limit. 
Accordingly, the taxpayer will choose vT such that tvT = max(tv* -
~ + E, 0). (Again, theE is an illustrative nominal amount, say $0.01.) 
Observe that the greater the agent's audit cost ~ the lower the value 
the taxpayer can return. Moreover, impounded in the Nash value v* 
are the relative bargaining strengths of the two players with respect 
to litigation costs. For instance, a relatively high litigation cost LT 
for the taxpayer tends to increase v*, resulting in a higher reported vT. 
Note also that the taxpayer's audit cost AT is irrelevant in this 
one-taxpayer, single-period setting. Because of the ultimatum character 
of the return-filing stage, with communications biased in favor of the 
taxpayer, the Revenue Service agent cannot effectively use the taxpayer's 
audit cost as a bargaining threat. 
Basing vT on the Nash solution obviates actual verbal bargaining 
and thus constitutes an example of tacit bargaining. 8 
Example. As in the preceding example, let AT = $3, ~ = $4, t = 20%, 
and E(V ) = $150. Let the utility functions be those in the examples in 
c 
scenario S2, with LT = $20 and LR = $10, resulting in a Nash solution of 
v* = $175. 
The taxpayer in this situation will set tvT = tv* - ~ + $0.01 = 
$31.01. Then vT = $155.05. This provides the Revenue agent slightly 
more revenue than he expects to net by auditing. The taxpayer does not 
wish to induce an audit since that would be expected to result in a 
total cash outflow of tv* + ~ = $38.00. Even if ~ were zero, an 
audit would produce an expected cash requirement of $35.00. 
Risk Aversion with Costly Auditing and 
Litigation (S7) 
In scenario S4 it was found that the negotiation set is skewed in 
t t . f f th 1 h . 1 . k 9 mane ary erms 1n avor o e p ayer w o 1s ess r1s averse. This 
produces a (possibly) different Nash solution from that negotiated by 
risk-neutral players. This is one difference between the present 
situation and the preceding scenario. In addition, where utilities 
are not assumed to be linear in money, it is appropriate to replace 
cash outcomes with utilities in the exposition. 
Accordingly, the taxpayer will now return an ultimatum value vT 
just a nominal amount above that value which yields to the Revenue 
Service agent the same utility as the Nash solution less audit cost. 
That is, UR (tvT) = max[UR (tv* - ~+E), UR (O)], where v* is the Nash 
1 . . h f . k . 10 so ut1on 1n t e presence o r1s avers1on. Thus the reintroduction 
of risk aversion at this stage of the analysis produces little 
conceptual difference from the preceding scenario. The essence of 
risk aversion is captured in the Nash solution itself. 
Chapter Surrunary 
This chapter has addressed rational bargaining behavior between 
one taxpayer and a Revenue Service agent in a setting of complete 
information. It was shown that litigation costs and risk aversion 
create incentives for resolving estate and gift tax valuation disputes 
out of court. Similarly, audit costs create an incentive for settling 
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without even going through the audit process, but here the communication 
system is strongly biased in favor of the taxpayer. Consequently, a 
rational taxpayer will return a value equal to the expected negotiated 
settlement, discounted by an amount reflecting the agent's auditing 
cost. 
With respect to the nature of any negotiated settlement, rational 
behavior and rational expectations lead the taxpayer and agent to the 
Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi bargaining solution. This agreement point was 
computed for some illustrative examples. The negotiation set of 
potential settlements tends to be skewed in favor (monetarily) of the 
party with lower litigation costs and less risk aversion. 
Since in no situation in the chapter was there an incentive to 
litigate, a tentative implication of this basic analysis is that 
policymakers might encourage out-of-court settlements by attempting 
to approximate an environment of complete information. For example, 
a requirement that the courts write lucid and informative decisions 
would presumably enhance litigants' attempts to estimate the objective 
probability distribution of valuation decisions. (Whether this is 
an appropriate conclusion will become more apparent in Chapter IV, 
where the complete information assumption is relaxed.) 
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ENDNOTES 
1This is consistent with the settlement authority of the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
2Recall that the normal form displays the game as if each player 
chose a full strategy in advance. The matrix entries give the expected 
payoff for each combination of strategies of the two players. The 
taxpayer's maximin strategy is represented by Row 2 (litigate) because 
the "worst" possible loss from employing that strategy is -tE(Vc), which 
is superior to the worst possible loss (-tvR) from employing strategy 1. 
Similarly, the agent's maximin strategy is Column 2 (reject vT) because 
the worst possible gain (tE(Vc)) with that strategy is superior to the 
worst possible gain (tvT) from employing strategy 1. Note that the 
lower left-hand entry of the matrix in Figure 3 represents the irrational 
but technically feasible possibility that the taxpayer would litigate 
even though the agent had accepted vT. This corresponds to a bifurcation 
of the top branch of the extended form in Figure 2 whereby the technical 
possibility of litigation in such a situation could be portrayed; this 
option is omitted from Figure 2 as unrealistic. Also, litigation is 
loosely referred to as a strategy or choice; actually, institutional 
characteristics of the situation make litigation the automatic result 
of a breakdown in negotiations. 
3Following the usual convention, the random variable Vc is 
represented by a capital letter while the particular value vc is denoted 
in lower case. 
4sundem (1979) applied the Nash solution in another accounting-
related context--that of the information evaluator (IE) - decision maker 
(EM) in information economics. He advises that the Nash concept is not 
above criticism and observes that such theories provide insights but not 
unique solutions to the IE-DM problem. Perhaps the taxpayer-Revenue 
agent setting, for which numerical data may be obtainable, will provide_ 
an arena for empirical testing of the Nash concept. Problems arising in 
similar efforts in the area of labor negotiations are discussed by 
Hamermesh (1973), Bognanno and Dworkin (1975), Bowlby and Shriver (1978) 
and Svejnar (1980). 
5For instance, if the taxpayer viewed publicity associated with 
litigation as a cost (Norwood et al., 1979), the agent's bargaining 
position would be improved. 
6Harsanyi (1977) supplies details of these arguments. His 
Theorem 8.4 (p. 158) states that the condition that the two players 




7This additive, linear expansion does not hold in general. 
8rhe principle of tacit bargaining (Harsanyi, 1977) implies that 
rational players, if sufficiently "intelligent," can reach any agreement 
they would reach by ordinary bargaining by mere tacit or nonvocal 
bargaining. Fellner (1965) and Schelling (1960), two proponents of the 
tacit bargaining principle, suggest that agreements may be reached by 
signaling each other's intentions without actually negotiating. In some 
cases, a certain agreement point may seem obvious or at least conspicuous 
to both parties, and they-might therefore propose that point independently 
(Schelling, 1960). In the complete information setting the only rational 
settlement point is the Nash solution. 
9In the special case of the exponential utility function, the 
expanded negotiation set is [CER- LR- ~· CET + LT + ~]. 
10since the Nash solution is available with certainty (Harsanyi, 
1977), the utility function notation is not strictly necessary; cash 
outcomes would suffice. 
CHAPTER IV 
BASIC MODEL II 
Multiple Taxpayers, Complete Information 
Overview 
Throughout this chapter the Revenue Service agent faces more than 
one taxpayer, each with one property to be valued. Other assumptions of 
the basic model are maintained or relaxed in the same sequential manner 
as in Chapter III, resulting in seven scenarios, numbered S8 through 
S14. In those settings where auditing and/or litigation are costly 
activities, it is assumed that the Revenue Service agent must operate 
with limited resources. If there are n taxpayers, time and/or budgetary 
constraints allow the agent to audit or litigate only k (k < n) cases. 
All Assumptions in Place (S8) 
In this setting, a risk-neutral Revenue Service agent faces n (n > 1) 
risk-neutral taxpayers. Auditing and litigation are costless. Each 
taxpayer has full information regarding the other taxpayers and the 
Revenue Service agent, and the agent has full information about all 
taxpayers. This information includes all players' utility functions, 
the range of possible values of properties in question and the objective 
probability distribution of court-determined values. This somewhat 
approximates real conditions in that a taxpayer normally has a reasonable 
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idea of how his situation compares with that of other taxpayers. It is 
assumed that taxpayers cannot form coalitions. 
Because no constraints exist on auditing and litigating, this 
scenario parallels the first scenario (S1) in Chapter III. The agent 
will treat each case independently, settling each in precisely the 
manner described in S1. Each taxpayer and the agent will be indifferent 
between a court-determined value v or an out-of-court settlement equal 
c 
to the mutually expected E(V ). No new issues arise from considering 
c 
multiple taxpayers. 
Costly Litigation (S9) 
The assumptions of this setting are the same as those of the 
preceding scenario except that litigation causes the Revenue agent an~ 
taxpayer to incur fixed costs LR and LTi (i = 1, 2, •.• , n), respectively. 
The agent is assumed to be able to observe all n tax returns within a 
single period and to base his audit and litigation strategy on information 
about all of them; in other words, he may wait until all n returns are 
received before making commitments to audit any of them. 
Now, if the Revenue Service agent has adequate resources to litigate 
against all n taxpayers, he can and should treat each case independently, 
negotiating a Nash settlement precisely as in the one-taxpayer situation 
(S2). No new issues arise beyond those addressed in the one-taxpayer 
case. 
The more interesting situation is that in which the agent has 
resources (money and/or time) to litigate against only k taxpayers, where 
1 < k < n. Assume for the moment that there are no audit costs. (Audit 
costs are considered in scenarios S12, S13, and S14.) 
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In such a situation, there is no incentive for the ith taxpayer to 
return a value vTi greater than zero. If audited, the worst expected 
outcome is a cash payment of tE(V .) +LT.' and a more favorable outcome 
Cl. l. 
should be available through negotiation. Furthermore, if the Revenue 
agent's litigation ca,pability is exhausted, the taxpayer will be 
invulnerable to the litigation threat and can negotiate a zero tax. 
However, consider the problem from the agent's perspective. He can 
list the taxpayers in decreasing order of E(V .), fori= 1, 2, ... , n. 
Cl. 
Thus the taxpayer with the greatest enforceable potential tax liability 
is numbered T1 . If the agent audits T1 first, then a Nash settlement 
will be attainable as in scenario S2. Rational behavior on the part of 
T1 and the agent results in a negotiated agreement which avoids litiga-
tion costs and is preferred by both players to litigation. (From T1 's 
point of view there is no incentive to litigate. Were the taxpayers 
able to collude, they could litigate until the agent's resources were 
exhausted, leaving the remaining n-k taxpayers free to pay no tax; a 
scheme of side payments could then be used to allocate the joint 
benefit of cooperation.) Thus a binding agreement is obtained, and the 
case of T1 is closed. 
Now the Revenue Service agent audits taxpayer T2 , who has the second 
largest potential tax liability. Still armed with a credible threat 
strategy, the agent negotiates a Nash settlement with T2 . Continuing 
in this manner, the agent obtains a mutually satisfactory agreement 
with each of the n taxpayers. The only requirements are that the agent 
be capable of litigating against one and they they not collude. 
Suppose that, instead of beginning with the taxpayer with the 
greatest potential tax liability, the Revenue agent selected first some 
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other taxpayer T. for audit. Under the assumption of complete information, 
1 
T. knows how many cases the agent can litigate and how many taxpayers 
1 
have a greater potential tax liability than his own. If the agent can 
litigate against k taxpayers, if the taxpayers are listed in descending 
order of potential tax (from T1 through Tn)' and if i > k, then Ti knows 
it would be irrational for the agent to expend scarce litigation 
resources against him. Litigating these "small" cases to the extent 
of exhausting his litigation resources would eliminate the agent's 
threat strategy. Consequently, T. may be in a position to negotiate 
l. 
a zero tax. 
Simply stated, the agent will audit the top "layer" of k taxpayers 
on the list first, then the next k, and so on. Order is unimportant 
within a given layer, but departure from the layer scheme places the 
agent in a bargaining situation with no credible threat strategy. 
The foregoing arguments support the following conclusion. 
Proposition. Assume the following: 
a. The assumptions of scenario S4 hold, with n noncolluding 
taxpayers; 
b. The Revenue Service agent can litigate k cases (1 < k < n); 
and 
c. Then taxpayers are numbered T1, T2 , ••. , Tn' in nonincreasing 
order of expected court-determined property value E(V .) 
Cl. 
( i = 1, 2, .•. , n) • 
Then a rational Revenue Service agent will negotiate Nash bargaining 
agreements first with taxpayers T1, ••• , Tk; then with Tk+1' ••• , T2k; 
•• • ; Tmk+1' ••• , T(m+1)k; etc., (m = 0, 1, •.• )until the list of 
taxpayers is exhausted. 
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Risk Aversion (SlO) 
As in Chapter III, allowing risk aversion on the part of one or 
more players is presumably the most appropriate alternative to the risk-
neutrality assumption. In this scenario auditing and litigation are 
costless so that the direct effect of risk aversion can be isolated. 
The absence of auditing and litigation costs enables the Revenue 
agent to audit and settle every case independently; processing one 
case does not affect the agent's ability to process others. Therefore, 
in those cases involving risk-neutral taxpayers, a risk-neutral agent 
will obtain in-court or out-of-court settlements as in scenarios Sl 
and S8. In those cases where the agent and/or taxpayer are risk averse, 
the analysis of scenario S3 applies. One would expect to observe an 
out-of-court settlement between the two certainty equivalents. As in 
S3, the Nash solution is offered as the rational settlement point. 
A plausible speculation is that in a multiple-taxpayer environment 
the Revenue Service agent will tend to exhibit risk neutrality. Faced 
with numerous cases, a diversification effect should occur, with the 
prospect of "winning" some cases offsetting the prospect of "losing" 
some others. However, the agent's aversion to risk seems likely to be 
stronger when the variance is higher--that is, in the relatively few 
large cases. This suggests one partial explanation for published data 
from The Wall Street Journal (1973) cited by Gould (1973) and reproduced 
as Table II. The data, released by the IRS in compliance with a court 
order, indicate that the Service settles over 90 percent of disputed 
cases out-of-court and that the settlement, as a percent of the 
initially alleged extra tax, decreases as the size of the case increases. 
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As in scenario S3, the negotiation set may be less skewed in favor of the 
S . . 1 1 ervlce ln arger cases. 
TABLE II 
PERCENT OF AGENT-ALLEGED EXTRA TAX DUE SETTLED FOR BY APPELLATE 
DIVISION IN CASES NOT DOCKETED FOR LITIGATION 
Percent Settled For Initial 
Alleged Shortage 1971 1972 













Source: Gould (1973). 
















the n taxpayers into layers of size k according to amount of potential 
tax. The presence of risk aversion merely widens each of the n 
negotiation sets and results in possibly different Nash solutions from 
those achieved in S9. 
Costly Auditing (S12) 
An interesting shift of the focus of the game appears when audit 
53 
costs are admitted into the analysis. Although the game between each 
taxpayer and the Revenue Service agent is still present, a budgetary 
or time constraint preventing the agent from auditing everyone induces 
a game among the taxpayers themselves. Whether a certain taxpayer is 
audited depends partially on the other taxpayers' situations and 
strategies. 
In this scenario it is assumed that an audit imposes a fixed cost 
on one or both parties to an audit but that litigation is costless. 
(Litigation cannot be conducted, however, unless an audit has occurred.) 
Under these conditions, if the Revenue agent has adequate resources to 
audit all taxpayers (albeit at some cost), the situation takes on the 
character of n independent copies of scenario S5. Each taxpayer T. will 
~ 
return the ultimatum value vT for which tvT max(tE(V .) - A . + 1¢, 0). 
c~ -""R~ 
This makes it unprofitable for the agent to audit anyone. 
Now assume a budgetary and/or time constraint permits the agent to 
conduct only k audits, where 1 ~ k < n. Assume, however, that he can 
and does observe all reported values, confirming them in light of his 
complete information. Thus information gathering is not a role of 
auditing in this scenario. This screening process fully reveals the 
potential gains from auditing (up to the probability distribution of 
court-determined values). 
Any taxpayer Ti who returns vTi such that tvTi < tE(Vci) - ~i' 
as in the one-taxpayer setting, is safe from audit. Returning the 
minimum such "ultimatum value" is preferable to being audited, which 
would result in an expected payout of tE(V .) +AT .. But in the present 
c~ J. 
scenario, in which the Revenue Service agent can conduct a limited 
number of audits, the question arises whether a taxpayer could 
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successfully return a value lower than the ultimatum value. In the 
one-taxpayer setting, such action would draw an audit with certainty; 
in the multiple-taxpayer environment it might appear that a "low-priority" 
taxpayer--one with a relatively small potential tax--could, with impunity, 
report a zero value. 
Nevertheless, this conjecture fails. All the Revenue Service agent 
need do is annouce a policy of auditing all returns for which tvTi < 
tE(V .) -A., in descending order of E(V .). Unable to collude with 
Cl. -~]. Cl. 
other taxpayers, the one with the greatest E(V .), say T1 , will then set Cl. 
tvTi = tE(Vc 1) - ~1 • This frees the agent to audit T2 , who has the 
second largest E(Vc). Knowing this, T2 will set tv2 = tE(Vc2) - ~2 . 
The pattern continues through all n taxpayers. No audits occur, but 
if tE(V .) - A_. > 0 for all i, the total revenue collected is 
Cl. -~l. 
n 
L (tE(V .) -~.),which equals the expected amount that would be 
i=1 Cl. ]. 
collected if the agent could and did audit every return. 
The only complication arises if there exists a stratum of m 
taxpayers (k < m ..S. n) with the same tE (V . ) - A_ • • Consider the 
Cl. -~l. 
situation a taxpayer T. in such a stratum faces. If he returns his 
]. 
ultimatum value, he will, with certainty, escape audit. If he returns 
an amount less than his ultimatum value, he may or may not escape audit, 
depending on what the other m-1 taxpayers in the stratum do. Note that 
his security level for any strategy of reporting a value lower than the 
ultimatum value is tE (V ci) + ~i. This is his expected payoff if the 
other members of the stratum report their ultimatum values. Moreover, 
this is the security level of any probability mixture of strategies 
which involves a strategy of returning less than the ultimatum value. 
On the other hand, his security level for the strategy of returning his 
ultimatum value is tE(Vci) - ~i· This is the most favorable security 
level for any strategy and is therefore T.'s maximin payoff. Returning 
~ 
the ultimatum value, then, is a maximin strategy. 
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Lemma 1. Lets= (s 1, s 2 , ..• , sm) be any equilibrium point for the 
m taxpayers with the same value of tE(V .) -A .. Then sis a maximin 
c~ -~~ 
point. 
Proof. An equilibrium point always yields each player at least 
his maximin payoff (Harsanyi, 1977). If any strategy component s. of s 
~ 
involves reporting a vTi lower than the ultimatum value, then at least 
one taxpayer will be audited, producing for that taxpayer a payoff less 
favorable than his maximin payoff, contrary to the assumption that s is 
an equilibrium point. Therefore, all strategies in s must report the 
ultimatum value, making s a maximin point. 
Lemma 2. The game is unprofitable to all m taxpayers in the stratum. 
Proof. Since, by Lemma 1, no equilibrium point yields any taxpayer 
a payoff superior to his maximin payoff, every equilibrium point is 
unprofitable to every player. Thus no player can rationally expect to 
receive better than his maximin payoff and the game is unprofitable to 
every player. 
The arguments in the foregoing paragraphs establish the following. 
Proposition. In a one-period, complete-information setting with n 
risk-neutral, noncolluding taxpayers and costly auditing, every taxpayer 
will return a value vTi just large enough to make it unprofitable for the 
Revenue Service agent to audit that taxpayer. 
The threat of an audit, with its attendant cost, induces every 
taxpayer to return vT such that tvT = tE(Vci) - ~i (plus, say, 1¢). 
To summarize this scenario, the following observations were made: 
a. Even though the Revenue Service agent cannot audit everyone, 
every taxpayer will behave as if the agent would audit if it were 
profitable to do so. This stems from the agent's complete information 
and the inability of taxpayers to form coalitions. 
b. Because of this behavior, there will be no actual audits or 
litigation. The Revenue Service agent will collect total revenue of 
n 
L (tE(V .) -A.), provided tE(V .) . 1 c~ -""R~ c~ 
~i > 0 for all i. 
~= 
Costly Auditing and Costly Litigation (S13) 
In the preceding scenario, in which litigation was costless, the 
rational solution to a dispute over the value of property was E(V .). 
c~ 
When litigation costs are considered, a rational Revenue Service agent 
would arrive at the Nash solution v~ with taxpayer T. if an audit were 
~ ~ 
to occur. 
Now, as in the one-taxpayer case, the costliness of an audit, 
coupled with the communication bias in favor of the taxpayer, enables 
the taxpayer to return the ultimatum value vTi (such that tvTi = 
max(tv~ - A_. + 1¢,0)) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The agent will 
~ -""R~ 
"leave it" because in this one-period setting with complete information 
there is nothing to be gained by conducting random unprofitable audits. 
But the question again arises whether a taxpayer could successfully 
avoid audit while returning lower than his ultimatum value when the 
agent lacks the capability to audit all n taxpayers. This question 
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was addressed in scenario Sl2, where it was found that the answer is 
negative in a noncooperative, complete-information environment. 
Reintroducing litigation costs produces no conceptual difference 
from scenario S12, except for the substitution of the Nash value v~ in 
1 
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place of E(VCi). Thus every potential conflict will be tacitly resolved 
at the return-filing stage, with each taxpayer returning his ultimatum 
value. Because the Nash solution impounds relative litigation costs, 
the ultimatum value does so as well. Consequently, it is to the agent's 
advantage to reduce litigation (and auditing) costs even though under 
the complete information assumption no litigation or audits will actually 
occur. 
Risk Aversion with Costly Auditing and 
Litigation (S14) 
As in scenario S7, the reintroduction of risk aversion causes no 
conceptual change from the risk-neutrality situation, except for the 
use of the Nash settlement v~ for (possibly) risk-averse players. 
1 
Taxpayer Ti will return a value vTi such that UR(tvTi) = max[UR(tv! -
~i + 1¢), UR(O)]. This vTi is the taxpayer's ultimatum value, and 
the agent will accept it. The threat of an audit induces the n 
noncolluding taxpayers to play their maximin strategies of reporting 
their ultimatum values as in S12. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter extends the one-taxpayer analysis of Chapter III to a 
multiple-taxpayer environment. The results are similar. Even with a 
limited capacity to audit, the Revenue agent is able to extract a 
"reasonable" tax, based on the "true" or court-determined value, from 
every taxpayer. With taxpayer collusion disallowed, each taxpayer 
essentially faces the agent independently. Although the fact that the 
taxpayer has the first move allows him to submit an ultimatum value 
which takes advantage of the agent's audit cost, a rational taxpayer 
would not unilaterally return a lower value in an environment of 
complete information. Luce and Raiffa (1957) discuss such a situation, 
in which rational pursuit of self interest forces players into a 
socially undesirable outcome. They acknowledge that the players will 
be "completely frustrated." Harsanyi (1977) suggests the term "quasi-
solution" for such a maximin "solution." The players (taxpayers) are 
simply protecting their maximin payoffs; each player is setting an 
objective which can be achieved without cooperation. 
In conclusion, in order to find a rationale for auditing and 
litigating, apart from their threat or deterrent value, it will be 
necessary to relax t~e assumption of complete information. This is 
the theme of the following chapter. 
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ENDNOTE 
1This does not explain why the percents drop off so drastically 
as case size increases. Posner (1972) argues that an administrative 
agency may vigorously pursue small cases in the aggregate because of 
a higher anticipated success rate, and that smaller disputants tend to 
be relatively pessimistic about their chances in court (a manifestation 
of incomplete information, to be discussed in the next chapter), giving 
the agency more bargaining power in small cases. Of course, larger 




BASIC MODEL III 
One Taxpayer, Incomplete Information 
Overview 
Since the complete information assumption implies that all players 
know the rules of the game, relaxing that assumption requires a speci-
fication of which rules or aspects of the situation are unknown to whom. 
Total ignorance on the part of all players is needlessly severe, so one 
must be selective with respect to the amount and type of information 
assumed unknown. 
It seems appropriate to assume (1) that the tax return does not 
necessarily reveal full information about the property being valued, so 
there is an information asymmetry, (2) that an audit removes the 
asymmetry, and (3) that despite equal information the disputants may 
have divergent probability beliefs about the court decision. 1 All other 
aspects of the complete information assumption are retained. 
All Assumptions in Place (S15) 
Because there are not audit costs in this scenario, the return will 
be audited, and the parties will have equal information. The difference, 
then, between this scenario and previous setting lies in the possibility 
of divergent probability assessments of the court-determined outcome. 
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Although the parties are assumed to possess equal information at the 
conclusion of an IRS examination, that information may not reveal the 
objective probability distribution of the court decision. As a product 
of differing backgrounds, roles, preferences and information processing 
techniques, the players may form divergent subjective probability beliefs. 
For instance, Raiffa (1982) reports that experimental subjects with 
identical information and with roles of plaintiff or defendant assigned, 
tended to view their own chances in litigation as better than their 
opponents viewed them. On the other hand, control subjects without 
assigned roles tended to agree on their probability assessments. 
In order to keep the range of possible combinations of directions 
of divergence and relative litigation costs and risk premiums manageable 
and to enhance realism, it will be assumed throughout this study that 
where probability assessments diverge it is in the "mutually optimistic" 
direction reported by Raiffa (1982). This eliminates the apparently 
unlikely situation in which each disputant views his own chances in 
court as worse than his opponent views them. 
Now, if the taxpayer's subjective probability distribution has 
mean ET(Vc)' the Revenue agent's has mean ER(Vc)' and ER(Vc) > ET(Vc)' 
then the negotiation set is empty and all cases will be litigated. 
Each party has no incentive to litigate and, in this particular 
scenario, no incentive not to litigate. 
Note that if the court selects any value v between ET(V ) and 
c c 
ER(Vc)' both litigatns may be expected to express dissatisfaction with 
the outcome. This phenomenon, which is anomalous in a constant-sum 
situation, is said to be observed from time to time in actual litigation. 
Costly Litigation (S16) 
With costless auditing, the return will be audited, placing the 
Revenue Service agent on an equal footing with the taxpayer with regard 
to information. If, despite equal information, they are still mutually 
optimistic about going to court, they have an incentive to litigate. 
However, litigation costs constitute a disincentive. Thus whether a 
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case goes to court depends on the relative strengths of these conflicting 
incentives. 
Case 1. Assume that ET(Vc) < ER(Vc) but tET(Vc) + LT > tER(Vc) - LR. 
That is, the taxpayer expects the court to determine a value which is 
lower than the Revenue agent expects, but when litigation costs are 
considered, the taxpayer expects to pay more than the agent expects to 
net. This creates a negotiation set. Any outcome in the interval 
(tER(Vc) - ~· tET(Vc) + LT) would make both players better off than 
would a litigated solution. 
If the players communicate their expectations during negotiations, 
the game becomes essentially one of complete information; all the 
inputs for computing the Zeuthen risk limits (scenario S2) are present, 
and rational bargaining will lead to the Nash solution. 2 
Example. Let ET(Vc) = $150, ER(Vc) = $160, LT = $20, LR = $10, 
and t = 20%. Then tET(Vc) + LT = $50 and tER(Vc) - LR = $22, yielding 
a negotiation set of (22, 50) in terms of dollars received and paid, 
or (110, 250) in terms of property value. The Nash product, from 
equation (3) of Chapter III, is 
N(v) = (UT(v) - UT(c))(UR(v) - UR(c)) 
(-tv+ tET(Vc) + LT)(tv- tER(Vc) + LR) 
2 2 2 2 2 
-tv + t vER(Vc) - tvLR + t vET(Vc) - t ET(Vc)ER(Vc) + 
tET(Vc)LR + tvLT - tER(Vc)LT + LTLR 
Setting N'(v) = 0 and solving for the maximizing value v* yields 
v* = 
t(ER(Vc) + ET(Vc)) - LR + LT 
2t = $180 
Note that N"(v) = -2t2 < 0, so v* maximizes the Nash product. Thus the 
Nash settlement is a value of $180, producing a tax of $36. Since the 
two players have the same utility function in this scenario, the Nash 
solution lies at the midpoint of the negotiation set. Note that, in 
addition to impounding relative litigation costs, the Nash settlement 
captures the players' expectations. The less optimistic a player is 
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about the court decision, the less willing he will be to risk a conflict 
and hence the more concessively he will behave. 
Here the players are mutually optimistic about litigation, even in the 
presence of fixed litigation costs. The negotiation set is empty, and 
all cases will be litigated. The taxpayer and agent are willing to 
spend LT and LR, respectively, to obtain a court decision. This would 
be irrational in a complete information context and, since the court 
merely redistributes utility and does not create it, is undesirable 
in any case. 
Consequently, factors which contribute to reducing the "litigation 
illusion" fostered by incomplete information about the objective 
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probability distribution of court decisions should in turn reduce case-
load and inefficient spending for litigation. One such factor is 
precedent (Schotter, 1978). Development of clear precedent tends to 
cause convergence of expectations which, when complete, leads to 
situations such as scenario S2 wherein the costs of the litigation 
process are saved. If the effectiveness of an external conflict 
resolution mechanism is inversely related to the frequency of its use, 
the foregoing arguments support the writing of clear, instructive case 
decisions as a tool for reducing docket congestion. Thus the consistency 
with which Englebrecht and Davison (1977) observed the Tax Court to 
"split the difference" in valuation cases may have some redeeming value as 
reliable precedent despite its apparent lack of grounding in valuation 
3 theory. Similarly, the Bader and Central Trust cases provide usable 
precedent, though they too have little if any basis in financial theory 
(Englebrecht and Leeson, 1978). 
Risk Aversion (S17) 
With costless auditing, the return will be audited, removing any 
asymmetry of information. If divergence of expectations about a 
litigated solution persists despite equal information, whether a case 
goes to court depends on the strength of the players' optimism relative 
to their aversion to the risk associated with litigating. 
disputants are mutually optimistic with respect to the means of their 
subjective distributions, but the taxpayer's certainty equivalent is 
greater than that of the Revenue agent. Thus the taxpayer would be 
willing to pay CET with certainty rather than go to court, and the 
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agent would be willing to accept a lesser amount CER to avoid litigating. 
A diagram of the situation is shown in Figure 5. (Of course, for a 
risk-averse taxpayer CET is always greater than tET(Vc) (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976); conversely, for a risk-averse Revenue agent, CER is 
always less than tER(Vc) (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).) 
Figure 5. Sketch of Scenario S17, Case 1 
This circumstance creates a negotiation set between CER and CET. 
This negotiation set is not unlike that of scenario S3 but is narrower 
for a given level of risk aversion because now the expected values 
do not coincide. The Nash solution again describes the rational 
resolution of the conflict. 
Example. Assume, as in the example in scenario S3, that UT(x) 
and UR(x) = x. Assume that the taxpayer believes that the random 
X = -e 
variable V follows a uniform distribution, resulting in a tax between 
c 
a and b. The Revenue agent also believes V is uniformly distributed 
c 
but results in a tax between a and d, where d > b. 
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b a 
CE = a+d As in S3, CET = ln( e - e ) . Similarly, instance, b-a R 2 For 
if a 0, b = 10, and d 12, CE ln( (e 10 1) /10) = $7.70 and CE = = = -
T R 
$6.00, so CER < CET, as required. The negotiation set is [6.00, 7.70], 
which is narrower than the interval [5.00, 7.70] from the example in 
S3. The Nash product, in terms of dollars paid and received, is 
b a 
= (-ex __ e_--:--e_ ) (x _ a+d ) 
a-b 2 
Differentiating and setting N'(x) = 0 yields 
b a 
ex( a+d _ x _ l) _ e - e = 0 
2 a-b 
For a = 0, b = 10 and d = 12, the Nash solution in terms of tax dollars 
is x = $7.00 (which is equivalent to an underlying property value of $35). 
This exceeds the Nash solution of $6.70 in the example in scenario S3 
because the Revenue agent in the present case, being more optimistic, 
is more willing to risk a conflict and therefore will behave less 
concessively. 
mutual optimism prevails to the extent that the amount the taxpayer 
would be willing to pay to stay out of court falls short of the minimum 
amount the agent would be willing to accept. Thus the negotiation set 
is empty and every such case will be litigated. 
Risk Aversion and Costly Litigation (SIS) 
Again, with costless auditing, the Revenue Service agent will audit, 
thereby removing any information asymmetry. Whether litigation will 
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occur depends on whether the disputants' optimism toward a court 
solution is sufficiently strong to overcome two sources of aversion to 
litigation--cost and risk. 
As demonstrated in scenario S4, the presence of litigation costs 
increases the amount a risk-averse taxpayer is willing to pay with 
certainty to avoid litigation. Likewise, the presence of litigation 
costs decreases the amount a risk-averse Revenue agent is willing to 
accept with certainty rather than go. to court. This increase or decrease 
is linear and additive in the special case of players who exhibit 
constant risk aversion; that is, a taxpayer who was willing to pay CET 
to avoid costless litigation would now be willing to pay CET + LT, 
and a Revenue agent who was willing to accept CER would now be willing 
to accept CER- LR. Clearly, then, players in this scenario are more 
likely to negotiate a settlement than players in the preceding two 
settings. 
Case 1. Suppose ET(Vc) < ER(Vc) but CE~ > CE~, where the primed 
certainty equivalents impound litigation costs as in scenario S4. 
(Thus CE~ > CET if LT > 0, and CE~ < CER if LR > 0.) Figure 6 illustrates 
the situation. (Note that the condition CE' > CE' can be fulfilled even 
T R 
if CET < CER if litigation costs are sufficiently great. Therefore, 
some case 2 instances in scenario S17 may become case 1 situations upon. 
introduction of litigation costs.) 
The interval [CER' CE~] constitutes the negotiation set, within 
which the Nash solution should be negotiated as in S4. 
I 
tET(Vc) CE' R CER CET CE' T tER(Vc) 
Figure 6. Sketch of Scenario Sl8, Case 1 
case 2 of scenario Sl7, the negotiation set vanishes, and litigation 
will occur. Such instances should be more rare than they would be in 
a world without either litigation costs or risk aversion, both of 
which create incentives for out-of-court settlements. 4 
Costly Auditing (Sl9) 
In the complete information environment of SS it was found that 
the concept of an ultimatum game is helpful in understanding the 
situation which arises when auditing costs are considered. Because 
of the institutional arrangement whereby the taxpayer initiates 
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communication, the taxpayer is able to commit himself to a certain value 
vT which the Revenue Service agent can reject only by incurring a 
decrease in expected net revenue. Consequently, a rational agent in 
the single-period setting will accept vT, and no audit will occur. 
Relaxing the assumption that both parties have complete information 
before an audit leaves the ultimatum character of the situation 
fundamentally intact; the taxpayer still has the communication 
initiative. Now, however, as in the preceding scenario in this chapter, 
auditing takes on an information-gathering role inasmuch as the taxpayer 
normally has private information regarding the property whose value is 
in question. Unlike the preceding scenarios, if auditing is costly, it 
is not immediately clear whether an audit will occur. 
Upon receipt of the estate tax return, the Revenue Service agent 
will form a subjective probability distribution of court-determined 
property values based on available information. This information set 
includes the information supplied on the return as well as generally 
available information about similar properties. The agent realizes 
that the taxpayer may have some private information which is accessible 
to the agent only through an audit with fixed cost ~. 5 
Let ER(Vc) be the mean of the agent's subjective distribution and 
let t be the tax rate. Then before audit, the agent's assessment of 
the net proceeds to be received after audit is tER(Vc) - ~· (After 
audit, of course, ER(Vc) might be adjusted to, say, E~(Vc)' but the 
agent does not enjoy the benefit of this hindsight at the point the 
audit decision must be made.) Now suppose for the moment that the 
taxpayer, who has access to all information available to the agent, can 
compute ER(Vc). Then the situation essentially collapses to that of 
scenario S5; the taxpayer will return vT such that tvT is slightly 
greater than tER(Vc) - ~· and no audit will occur. Suppose, on the 
other hand, that the taxpayer does not know ER(Vc). Then he must 
suffer the consequences of any estimation errors he makes. If he 
overestimates ER(Vc)' he will pay more tax than necessary. If he 
underestimates ER(Vc)' he will draw an audit and incur some fixed 
cost ~· 
If the taxpayer underestimates ER(Vc)' setting tvT < tER(Vc) - ~· 
the agent's subjective best reply (based on the mean of the subjective 
probability distribution over the court or chance player's strategies) 
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is to audit. Upon completion of the audit, the scenario becomes 
identical to S15. Convergent expectations will lead to an out-of-court 
settlement, while mutually optimistic expectations will encourage 
litigation. In either case, each party experiences a deadweight loss 
equal to his audit cost. 
Costly Auditing and Costly Litigation (S20) 
As in previous scenarios incorporating litigation costs, these costs 
constitute a deterrent to direct use of the court as a resolution 
mechanism. If, after audit, the disputants agree on the distribution 
of possible court decisions, there is an unambiguous out-of-court Nash 
bargaining solution v* which will achieve the joint benefit of saving 
litigation costs. Rational players will negotiate this solution. 
(Recall that, in contrast, heterogeneous expectations after audit may 
result in litigation.) Assuming fo.r the moment that homogeneous 
expectations will obtain after audit, the Nash solution, rather than 
the court decision itself, becomes the object of prediction prior to 
audit. Of course, the Nash solution is a derivative of the expected 
court decision, so the latter is still relevant. 
Before audit, the Revenue Service agent will form a prediction 
v~ of v*. His concession limit with respect to the taxpayer's returned 
value vT is tv~ - ~· That is, the agent will audit if and only if 
tv < tv* -T R ~· 
Accordingly, the taxpayer will report vT such that tvT = 
max(tv~- ~ + E, 0), where Eisa small positive amount. This 
construction assumes that the taxpayer can calculate v~. If so, the 
vT so established will prevail, and no audit will occur. 
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If, on the other hand, the taxpayer cannot reliably estimate v~, 
he may either pay more tax than he could otherwise have paid or may draw 
an audit. This is a phenomenon of the incomplete information setting 
which did not exist in the complete information environment of 
Chapter III. 
Now, if there is no assurance that homogeneous expectations will 
obtain after audit, the situation described in scenario 816 arises. 
That is, if, despite equal information, the two parties remain 
sufficiently mutually optimistic about going to court, they may 
litigate. Case 2 of scenario 816 describes this possibility. 
Thus incompleteness of information tends to induce both costly 
audits and costly litigation. 
Risk Aversion with Costly Auditing and 
Litigation (821) 
Risk averse behavior and litigation costs were combined and 
considered in scenario 818. It was shown that in a setting of incomplete 
information risk aversion can overcome mutually optimistic expectations 
about the court outcome so that out-of-court settlements are possible. 
Audit costs and litigation costs were combined and considered in 
scenario 820. 
When there is a negotiation set, the presence of risk aversion 
induces a possibly different Nash solution v*' from that negotiated 
by risk-neutral players. The difficulty the taxpayer faces in 
calculating v~', the agent's forecast of the Nash solution, is 
compounded by the taxpayer's lack of knowledge of the agent's utility 
function. Previously it was implicitly assumed that both players knew 
that both utility functions were linear. 
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The present setting, then, is like scenario 520, with v~' replacing 
v~. The taxpayer will now tend to be less successful in selecting his 
ultimatum offer vT in order to pay as little tax as possible while 
avoiding an audit, owing to a diminished ability to compute v~'· 
Once an audit has occurred, audit costs become sunk costs and the 
situation becomes identical to scenario 518. Risk aversion will help 
to mitigate the tendency toward litigation caused by mutual optimism. 
Chapter Summary 
The chief result of this chapter is the intuitively appealing 
conclusion that incompleteness of information makes audits and 
especially litigation more likely despite their cost and even despite 
aversion to the hazards of litigation. Indeed, risk aversion plays 
a beneficial role from the two-party, social perspective, in that it 
creates some otherwise absent negotiation sets. 
This chapter sheds light on but does not establish the conjecture 
offered in the summary of Chapter III that out-of-court settlements are 
more likely when information is more complete. Whereas in a setting of 
complete information there is no incentive to litigate, incompleteness 
of information may foster divergent expectations and thus may lead to 
costly litigation. On the other hand, incompleteness of information 
presumably increases the variance of each player's subjective 
probability distribution of the court outcome. This strengthens 
risk-averse players' preference for an out-of-court settlement. Thus 
the general effect of incompleteness of information on the likelihood 
of litigation is ambiguous. 
Another product of incompleteness of information is that the 
taxpayer may be unable to determine the optimal value to report on the 
return, leading either to unnecessary tax payments or costly audits. 
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ENDNOTES 
1This third assumption, although contrary to the opinion of Rubin 
(1977), is consistent with empirical findings reported by Raiffa (1982) 
and theoretical analysis by Schetter (1978). 
2According to an IRS Appeals Officer questioned during preparation 
of this study, it is typical for both sides, during negotiations, to 
communicate their probability estimates regarding the court decision. 
3The IRS Appeals Officer mentioned in endnote 2 commented that, 
although unaware of the Englebrecht and Davison study, it had long 
been his perception that the court used a split-the-difference approach 
to valuation; he emphasized that court behavior is basic to the appellate 
process. 
4 
It should be noted that incompleteness of information presumably 
increases the variance of a player's subjective probability distribution 
of the court decision. Consequently, one would find the negotiation set 
between risk averse players to be larger, ceteris paribus, than in the 
complete information setting. The taxpayer's certainty equivalent 
increases while that of the agent decreases, giving rise to more case 1 
and fewer case 2 situations. In the incomplete information case, where 
the objective distribution of court decisions is not assumed known, 
conditions are actually those of uncertainty rather than risk. 
5In a similar valuation context, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
requires individual income taxpayers making charitable contributions of 
property valued at more than $5,000 to attach an independent appraisal 
to their tax returns. This type of rule provides information to the 
agent without necessitating an audit. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BASIC MODEL IV 
Multiple Taxpayers, Incomplete Information 
Overview 
This chapter combines is.sues considered separately in the preceding 
two chapters. Here the Revenue agent faces more than one taxpayer, each 
with one property to be valued. In contrast to the multiple taxpayer 
model considered in Chapter IV, the complete information assumption is 
now relaxed in the same sense as in Chapter V. Otherwise the development 
parallels that of Chapter IV, moving through the standard set of 
scenarios. In those settings where auditing and litigation are not 
assumed costless, it is assumed that the Revenue Service agent must 
operate with limited resources. If there are n taxpayers, time and/or 
budget constraints permit the agent to audit or litigate only k (k < n) 
cases. 
All Assumptions in Place (S22) 
In this setting, a risk-neutral Revenue Service agent faces n (n > 1) 
risk-neutral taxpayers. Auditing and litigation are costless. The tax 
return does not necessarily reveal full information about the property 
being valued, so the taxpayer may have private information. An audit 
will remove this information asymmetry, but, despite equal information, 
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the taxpayer and agent may have different probability beliefs concerning 
the court decision. 
The absence of auditing and litigation costs reduces this n-taxpayer 
situation to a set of n independent one-taxpayer situations. The agent 
will audit all n returns, negotiating or litigating n settlements in 
conformity with the pattern of the single-taxpayer scenario, SIS, in 
Chapter V. No new issues emerge beyond those considered in SIS. 
Costly Litigation (23) 
Since auditing is costless, the Revenue Agent will audit all n 
returns, placing him, by assumption, on an equal footing with all n 
taxpayers with respect to information. Litigation costs provide an 
incentive for all parties to settle their cases out of court. 
If the Revenue Service agent has adequate resources to litigate all 
n cases, he is in a position to handle each case independently, as in 
the n-taxpayer, complete information scenario, S9. Incompleteness of 
information gives each situation the character of case I or case 2 of 
the one-taxpayer scenario, SI6. Thus no new conceptual issues arise 
in the multiple-taxpayer environment provided the agent faces no 
constraints. The more interesting situation, then, is that in which 
the agent has the abili_ty to litigate against only k taxpayers, where 
I < k < n. 
Again, as a result of costless auditing, the agent will have 
information on each case equal to that of the taxpayer. Each taxpayer 
has knowledge of his own case but no specific information about any 
other. He would be expected to have some general notion of the 
magnitude of his potential tax relative to that of other taxpayers. 
Thus he can estimate whether his case makes him, say, a "big taxpayer," 
a "small taxpayer" or a "medium-sized taxpayer." It is instructive 
to assume for the moment that public records of litigated cases are 
immediately available, making each taxpayer aware of how many cases 
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have already gone to court during the period. Also assume that the 
Revenue agent's litigation constraint is a matter of public knowledge. 
Then in a hypothetical situation in which the agent had already litigated 
k cases during the period, the remaining taxpayers would know they were 
invulnerable to litigation and would amend their returns to report zero 
values. 
Suppose the agent were to select a tax return haphazardly. Consistent 
with previous analysis, the situation would have the character of either 
case 1 or case 2 of scenario Sl6. That is, mutually optimistic expecta-
tions regarding the court decision would either be overcome by or would 
overcome the effect of litigation costs on the players' decision to 
litigate. A case-2 situation would result in litigation. After k 
such cases, the agent's litigation resources would be exhausted and all 
other taxpayers would escape tax. Some systematic approach to the 
selection of returns is therefore desirable to the agent if net 
revenues are to be maximized. 
First note that, in the absence of a penalty for underpayment of 
tax, the possibility of being selected for audit does not induce any 
taxpayer in this scenario to report a higher property value than he 
otherwise would. At worst, a Nash settlement can be negotiated or the 
taxpayer can willingly litigate. Therefore, any auditing strategy 
that depends on random selection of returns will fail to deter non-
compliance unless there is a penalty for underreporting. 
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The agent, then, will seek to maximize net revenues by pursuing cases 
in descending order of expected potential tax. He will form an expecta-
tion ER(V .) of each property's court-determined value, for i = 1, 2, 
C1 
.•. , n. (This expectation will be formed with the benefit of audit 
information since auditing is costless.) As in the complete information 
setting (S9), the agent will take on the largest k taxpayers first. As 
long as he has the capability of litigating against one taxpayer, he 
has a credible threat strategy and can achieve the Nash solution in any 
ease-l solution (that is, in any case in which litigation costs are 
sufficient to deter litigation despite mutual optimism about the court 
decision). The problem here which the agent did not face in the complete 
information environment is that some cases may be litigated. For example, 
in the extreme case of k = 1, the agent is stripped of his threat 
strategy as soon as one case goes to court. 






If k > 1, the agent has a credible threat strategy against T1 , and 
either the Nash agreement will be achieved, or, if mutual optimism is 
sufficiently strong, litigation will occur. If k = 1 (or, equivalently, 
if m cases have already been litigated and k- m = 1), the question 
arises whether the agent's threat to allow litigation is credible. The 
taxpayer knows that his is the last case the agent can litigate and that 
the aggregate tax potentially owed by the remaining taxpayers (which 
will be foregone by the agent if he litigates this case) may exceed the 
tax the agent could obtain in the present instance. Will the agent be 
willing to carry out his threat, or will he conserve resources in the 
hope of extracting tax from some or all of the remaining (smaller) 
taxpayers? 
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If the agent backs down and allows T1 to report a zero tax, his 
threat strategy loses credibility. Therefore, if T1 refuses to concede, 
the agent must carry out his threat and allow litigation. All remaining 
taxpayers will then amend their returns to escape tax. It may appear 
that this constitutes a large opportunity cost to the agent--that 
exhausting his litigation capability could be disastrous; however, 
unlike the complete information setting, there was no guarantee that 
those revenues could ever have been obtained. 
To summarize the discussion to this point, the agent may have to 
exhaust his litigation budget in this environment of incomplete 
information. This phenomenon should occur despite the taxpayers' 
inability to collude. Since the tax revenues the agent obtains may 
come from fewer than the full set of n taxpayers, he should select 
returns in descending order of expected potential tax. Under the 
assumption that his litigation constraint is publicly known, he will 
not necessarily capture the Nash tax from every taxpayer as was 
possible in the complete information setting of scenario S9. It would, 
seem advantageous, then, for the agent to conceal his litigation budget. 
The preceding may suggest why, in practice, IRS negotiators are 
instructed not to consider litigation costs explicitly in any particular 
case. This has the effect of withholding information from the taxpayer 
about the Service's propensity to litigate. In other words, a given 
taxpayer can be less certain than is assumed in the preceding discussion 
about the exact number of cases the agent will allow to go to court; 
the number k, therefore, is not publicly known, and the agent's threat 
strategy remains credible even after several cases have been litigated. 
A review of the foregoing analysis from this perspective suggests that 
the agent will be able to extract more revenues than indicated in that 
analysis. 
Risk Aversion (S24) 
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The absence of auditing and litigation costs permits the Revenue 
Service agent to handle each case independently. The analysis provided 
in scenario S17 of Chapter V then applies to each case. Recall that a 
negotiation set arises under the condition that the taxpayer's certainty 
equivalent tax exceeds that which the agent would be willing to accept. 
Risk Aversion and Costly Litigation (S25) 
Reintroducing litigation costs, now in the presence of risk aversion, 
poses no special analytical problems beyond those considered in the 
costly litigation situation of S23. On the "micro" level, risk aversion 
affects the nature of each negotiation set but, on the "macro" level, 
has no effect on the agent's stratified approach to return selection. 
Risk aversion widens negotiation sets and creates some sets where 
none would otherwise have existed. In particular, in the sense of 
scenario S16, the added incentive to negotiate resulting from risk 
aversion augments that incentive produced by litigation costs. Thus 
more cases should be settled out of court than would be negotiated in 
the presence of litigation costs alone. In a multiple-taxpayer environ-
ment, then, the Revenue Service agent will be able to conserve 
litigation resources more easily than he could in scenario S23. His 
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threat strategy will tend to be credible even longer, and he will be 
able to extract Nash settlements from more taxpayers before exhausting 
his capability. Not only will each risk-averse taxpayer who settles 
with the agent pay more tax, but taxpayers will pay who otherwise would 
have escaped tax. 
Costly Auditing (S26) 
Suppose that auditing is not a costless activity. Recall that its 
role includes, in addition to allowing initiation of negotiations, 
placing the Revenue Service agent on an equal basis with the taxpayer 
as to information about the property being valued. That is, auditing 
has an information-gathering function. Before audit, the agent's 
estimate of the value a court would determine is presumably inferior 
to that estimate which is possible after audit. 
If the agent has adequate resources to audit all n taxpayers, then 
each taxpayer will report a value slightly above his estimate of the 
agent's concession limit, as in the single-taxpayer scenario, S19. 
Some audits may occur because of taxpayers' inability to determine the 
agent's estimate of the court decision. 
The more interesting consequences of allowing for multiple taxpayers 
arise when the agent must operate under a constraint which permits only 
k audits, where 1 < k < n. In the complete information setting of 
scenario S12 it was found that even under such a constraint the agent 
received the sum of the n individual ultimatum taxes. In that setting, 
the agent initiated communications by announcing a policy of auditing 
all returns for which tvT. < tE(V .) -A ., in descending order of 
1 C1 -~1 
expected court decision, E(V .) . This succeeded because all parties 
C1 
knew E(V .) and the taxpayers could not collude. The taxpayer with the 
Cl 
greatest potential tax was effectively forced to report his ultimatum 
tax, as were the other n-1 taxpayers in somewhat of a "domino" pattern. 
If it is assumed that all taxpayers can compute the agent's 
expectation ER(V .) of each court decision, then the present scenario 
Cl 
collapses to that considered in scenario S12; each taxpayer will report 
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vT. such that tvT. is slightly greater than tER(V .) - ~ ., and no audits 
l l Cl -""Rl. 
will occur. Consider, however, the more plausible condition that the 
taxpayers cannot necessarily compute all ER(Vci). They may be able to 
classify themselves approximately as "big," "medium", or "small" 
taxpayers, as in scenario S23 and actual practice, but they cannot 
produce a reliable ranking by ER(V .). Moreover, any approximate 
Cl. 
ranking one taxpayer might produce is not known by the o~her taxpayers. 
Again, consider a possible audit policy of selecting returns 
arbitrarily, haphazardly or randomly for audit. No action by the 
taxpayer, including correct reporting, can afford protection from 
such a scheme. Therefore, any such approach provides no deterrent to 
underreporting unless a penalty is imposed for being caught. In the 
absence of a penalty structure, therefore, the agent must consider a 
systematic approach to return selection in order to maximize net 
revenue (tax revenue minus audit cost). 
Each taxpayer has an incentive (audit cost) to avoid being audited. 
Two conditions would enable the Revenue Service agent to exploit this 
incentive: 
1. The agent's audit policy should reward "correct" reporting by 
decreasing the probability that returns reporting values consistent 
with the agent's expectations will be audited. 
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2. The taxpayers must believe that the agent has the capability of 
conducting at least one audit. The greater the agent's audit capacity, 
the more correct reporting will occur. (Note the contrast between this 
statement and the results under complete information in scenario S12. 
There the ability to conduct only one audit was sufficient to extract 
the ultimatum tax from any number of taxpayers.) 
The natural audit policy, then, is that which selects returns based 
on the agent's estimate of amount of underpayment. Returns should be 
selected in descending order of 
tER(V .) -A . - tvT. 
C1 -""R1 1 
Because of errors by taxpayers in estimating ER(V .), there will be 
C1 
some audits (as in scenario S19). This means that the Revenue Service 
agent will wish to utilize limited audit resources on the largest cases. 
The behavior this policy induces among noncolluding taxpayers 
depends partially on the size of k relative to n. The k/n ratio or 
other comparison is an argument in the ith taxpayer's subjective 
assessment of the probability of being audited. Let f[k/n, tER(V .) -
C1 
~i - tvTi] represent this subjective probability function, where 
ER(V .) is the taxpayer's estimate of the agent's expectation of court-
C1 
determined value and ~i is the taxpayer's estimate of the agent's 
audit cost. Then f is an increasing function of both arguments. 
If audited, the ith taxpayer expects to pay a tax of tET(V .) plus 
C1 
audit cost ATi. His total expected cash payment, then, is [tET(V .) + 
C1 
ATi]f(•,•). Holding k/n constant, the expected payment if audited is 
[tET(V .) + A_.]f(tER(V .) -A_. - tvT. lk/n) 
C1 -'T1 C1 -~1 1 
If not audited, the taxpayer's expected payment is tvTi(l-f(•)). The 
expected cash payment in this game, for a given value of k/n, is 
therefore equal to 
The taxpayer's decision problem is to select vTi to minimize this 
expected payment. 
At this point a subtle distinction should be noted between two 
potential subjective probability distributions a taxpayer might form. 
One of the n taxpayers might estimate the probability that any taxpayer 
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will be audited, as a function of k/n and the spread between the estimate 
of the agent's expected court-decreed tax and the tax on the reported 
value, net of audit cost. The latter argument, tER(Vci) - ~i- tvTi' 
clearly contains three variables when all taxpayers are considered 
(i = 1, 2, ... , n). In contrast, the taxpayer would be expected to 
estimate the probability that his particular return will be audited, 
again as a function of k/n and the spread between the tax on the 
estimated valuation according to the agent and the tax on the taxpayer's 
" " reported value, net of audit cost. Here the ER(Vci) and ~i are 
constant since only one taxpayer is being considered (i is fixed). The 
probability of audit now varies only as vTi changes and is conditional 
not only on k/n but on ER(V .) and A_. as well. For notational 
Cl -~1 
" " convenience, the function f(vTijk/n, ER(Vci)' ~i) will be written 
as f(vT) in the following. 
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The taxpayer's expected cash outflow may now be written 
(1) 
If f is differentiable, setting the first derivative equal to zero yields 
a necessary condition for a payment-minimizing value of vT. 
0 
Depending on the explicit formulation of f(vT), it may be possible to 
solve (2) for the desired vT. The sufficient condition for vT to 
minimize (1) is 
[tET(vc) + AT]f"(vT) 2tf'(v) tv f"(v) > 0 - . T - T T 
at that value of vT. 
(2) 
Observe that an ultimatum game situation exists here as in previous 
scenarios in which the costless audit assumption was relaxed. The 
taxpayer's decision model calls for a reported value not exceeding the 
(estimated) ultimatum value. In other words, the taxpayer makes an 
irrevocable commitment to a value before the Revenue Service agent 
chooses his demand. In making that commitment, the taxpayer considers 
the agent's economic incentives not to waste audit resources. These 
considerations, in the absence of an underpayment penalty, tend to 
result in a reported value near or perhaps even below the agent's 
concession limit, which itself is lower than the property's probable 
court-decreed value. Unlike the one-taxpayer setting, the present 
situation calls for the taxpayer to contemplate a nonzero probability 
of escaping audit. This was not possible even in the multiple-taxpayer 
setting when complete information was assumed. 
Costly Auditing and Costly Litigation (S27) 
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The analysis of the preceding scenario holds in the present situation 
with the following modifications: 
1. Instead of simply estimating ER(Vc) as an argument of the 
probability of audit, the taxpayer will form an estimate v~ of v~, the 
agent's prediction of the Nash solution achievable after audit. For 
example, if the taxpayer believes the agent expects heavy litigation 
costs, v~ will be lower than it would otherwise be. 
2. Similarly, the taxpayer's own prediction v~ of v* replaces 
ET(Vc) in the analysis. The Nash solution, as the expected ultimate 
outcome, captures relative litigation costs and is the relevant object 
of prediction. 
The appropriateness of a bargaining solution as the predicted 
ultimate outcome is subject to the existence of enough homogeneity of 
expectations to produce a "ease-l" situation in the sense of scenario 
Sl6. A ease-l situation is one in which the players are both optimistic 
about going to court, but litigation costs are sufficient to dominate 
their optimism and lead them to a settlement. Otherwise, they will 
litigate (a "case-2" situation). 
To determine whether a taxpayer can predict at the return-filing 
stage whether case 1 or case 2 will ultimately prevail, consider the 
condition which distinguishes the two cases. That condition is 
subjective in nature--each party lacks knowledge of the objective 
distribution of the court decision, and, moreover, each subjective 
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distribution tends to be biased (in the direction of optimism). It is 
the extent of this bias that distinguishes the two cases. Given the 
subjectivity of this condition which sends cases to court, it seems 
probable that each player is surprised that the other refuses to make a 
concession. Each is unable to detach himself from his own beliefs and 
thinks the other must surely be making a mistake by allowing litigation. 
It is unlikely, then, that at the outset the taxpayer would anticipate 
litigation; consequently, he will estimate the Nash agreement rather 
than simply the court decision unadjusted for relative litigation costs. 
As always when audit costs are present, the taxpayer is in a 
position to make an ultimatum offer which makes it barely unprofitable 
for the Revenue Service agent to perform an audit. Estimation errors 
in a world with incomplete information, however, will give rise to 
some audits, raising the possibility that some taxpayers, because of 
the agent's time and/or budget limitation, will escape audit. 
Risk Aversion with Costly Auditing and 
Litigation (S28) 
In scenario S25, where risk aversion was combined with litigation 
costs, it was found that risk aversion and litigation costs tend to 
affect the number and size of out-of-court settlements negotiated 
following audit. Since there were no audit costs in that scenario, 
the problem of attempting to avoid audit costs was not addressed. 
It now becomes potentially important, in the presence of audit 
costs, for the taxpayer at the return-preparation stage to consider 
the agent's certainty equivalent tax. In scenarios in this chapter 
where risk neutrality was assumed it was also implicitly assumed that 
each player correctly considered the other to be risk neutral. Now the 
taxpayer should incorporate an estimate of the Revenue Service agent's 
utility for possible outcomes (rather than simply the dollar amounts of 
the outcomes) when formulating an optimal value vT to place on the tax 
return. This additional estimation problem introduces additional 
potential error; it is more difficult to estimate the agent's forecast 
of the Nash solution when that solution is influenced by an unknown 
utility function. 
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Compared to the preceding scenario, the taxpayer's diminished ability 
to discern the agent's utility for potential outcomes should result in 
(1) a tendency for the occurrence of more audits and (2) a tendency for 
more taxpayers to pay more tax than necessary to avoid audit. With 
audit and litigation capabilities limited, the agent will continue to 
pursue cases from largest to smallest in terms of potential tax. 
Taxpayers will continue to report ultimatum values in an effort to pay 
the least tax while avoiding audit. These ultimatum values will be 
based on the estimated risk-adjusted Nash settlement achievable after 
audit. 
As noted in scenario SlO of Chapter IV, it is possible that any 
risk aversion on the part of the Revenue Service agent is mitigated by 
a diversification effect inherent in a multiple-taxpayer environment. 
This would generally increase the size of negotiated tax settlements. 
Chapter Summary 
Chapters III, IV, and V served as building blocks for the model 
discussed in this chapter. Here the Revenue agent faces multiple 
taxpayers in a setting of incomplete information. Although analysis 
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and conclusions are less precise and more qualitative when the complete 
information assumption is relaxed, the basic patterns of behavior 
portrayed in the complete information case remain largely unchanged. 
Except as explained below, a settlement exists which both players would 
prefer to litigation because of aversion to litigation costs and to the 
risk associated with court behavior. Moreover, a tax exists which the 
taxpayer would rather pay and the Revenue Service agent would rather 
receive than experience the costs of an audit. Therefore, with 
restrictions imposed by limited information about the agent's utility 
function and predicted outcome, the taxpayers will report taxes which 
they believe are just large enough to prevent audit. Within restrictions 
stemming from limited information regarding the properties being valued, 
the agent will pursue cases in descending order of perceived tax 
deficiency. Perceived tax deficiencies arise when taxpayers have 
underestimated the agent's expected settlement. Such cases will draw 
audits, up to some exogenously imposed limit on the agent's auditing 
capacity. Some taxpayers, because of this limit and because of the 
relatively small values of their properties, may significantly 
understate their tax (absent a penalty for underpayment). This was 
not true in the complete information setting. 
After an audit has occurred, it is possible that negotiations may 
fail to produce a settlement. This will occur when each disputant 
expects to fare better in court, notwithstanding litigation costs and 
risk, than his opponent expects him to fare. In one sense, incomplete 
information produces this phenomenon of "litigation illusion," thereby 
contributing to usage of the court as a conflict resolution mechanism. 
In another sense, for risk-averse disputants, incomplete information 
creates uncertainty about the court's behavior, thereby reducing usage 
of the court. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study supplies an economic analysis of the conflict between 
estate taxpayers and an Internal Revenue Service representative over 
the value of estate property whose transfer is subject to tax. Because 
values of many properties are difficult to determine, there is frequently 
a broad range of possibilities from which a single value must emerge. 
The federal estate tax system provides for the filing of a tax return, 
followed by possible examination (audit), negotiation and litigation. 
This study explores, from a theoretical perspective, conditions under 
which a resolution of the conflict may arise at one of these stages 
and specifies the nature of the resolution. 
Chapter I provides an introduction to the study. It includes a 
discussion of the valuation problem and a summary of some previous 
applications of quantitative methods to tax conflict research. 
Chapter II describes the game-theoretic framework used in the study. 
Included are the rationality postulates assumed to guide disputants' 
behavior and an enumeration of the assumptions maintained and relaxed 
in the 28 scenarios examined in the remaining chapters. 
Chapter III covers the first of four basic models. One taxpayer 
faces one Revenue Service agent in an environment with complete 
information; the court is treated as a chance player. In this setting, 
complete information permits all valuation disputes to be settled out 
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of court, avoiding audit costs, litigation costs and the risk associated 
with the chance player's stochastic behavior. Interestingly, the 
communication system initially is strongly biased in favor of the 
taxpayer, who will report a value equal to the expected negotiated 
settlement, discounted by an amount reflecting the agent's auditing 
cost. This is an example of a fairly rare situation known as an 
ultimatum game. 
The presence of costs and risk aversion turns a noncooperative game 
into a cooperative one, as both players seek to obtain a settlement 
which saves those costs and allocates the savings between them. The 
negotiated settlement implied by the rationality postulates is the 
Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi bargaining solution. This agreement point 
captures the two players' relative litigation costs and aversion to the 
risk of litigation. Chapter III furnishes details and examples of the 
agreement. 
Chapter IV extends the one-taxpayer analysis with complete informa-
tion to a multiple-taxpayer environment. Contrary, perhaps, to 
intuition, no taxpayer will be able to avoid paying tax, even if the 
Revenue agent has the capacity to audit only one return. However, no 
taxpayer will pay more than that tax which makes it just unprofitable 
for the agent to audit. Costly audits, as well as costly and risky 
litigation, are avoided; but the taxpayer exploits the communication 
initiative by capturing the agent's audit cost. 
Chapter V returns to the one-taxpayer environment but relaxes the 
complete information assumption. Unlike the complete information 
setting, incompleteness of information may foster overly optimistic 
subjective probability assessments regarding the outcome of litigation, 
thus sending cases to court which otherwise would have been settled in 
the appellate process. This suggests that the court might help to 
reduce its own caseload by writing clear precedent which improves 
potential litigants' information about future court behavior. Previous 
research indicates this is not generally being done by the Tax Court 
in the valuation area. On the other hand, however, incompleteness of 
information tends to increase the variance of potential litigants' 
subjective probability distributions, making risk-averse players less 
likely to litigate. This beneficial aspect of incomplete information, 
however, seems less appealing than the benefits to be achieved by 
improving information regarding the court. 
In Chapter VI the Revenue Service agent faces multiple taxpayers 
in a setting of incomplete information. Analysis and conclusions are 
less rigorous and more qualitative in this environment, but the basic 
patterns of behavior portrayed in the earlier chapters remain fairly 
constant. The most notable difference is that in this setting it is 
possible for some taxpayers to understate their tax and still escape 
audit. This is a product of the agent's limited capacity to audit, 
combined with the possibility that some audits and litigation will 
occur in the absence of complete information. 
In Chapter I the question was raised as to whether the observed 
tendency on the part of the Tax Court toward compromise valuation in 
estate tax cases is a reasonable surrogate for negotiated settlements. 
The analysis in this study suggests that such would be true only if 
the players' utility functions and audit and litigation costs were 
similar. Only then would the Nash solution "split the difference." 
A limitation of the study is that it does not consider such aspects 
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of negotiation as relative bargaining skills and notions of fairness 
or equity. Consequently, it provides insight into this question but 
not a definitive answer. 
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This study suggests certain behavioral effects of provisions of the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 with respect to 
(1) recovery of litigation costs and (2) penalties for using the Tax 
Court to argue a groundless position. Item (1) tends to encourage 
litigation by establishing a reduction in expected litigation costs in 
the taxpayer's analysis. An expected litigation cost, which, for any 
nonzero probability of recovery, is smaller than the "certain" 
litigation cost LT considered in the analysis, replaces LT. This 
produces a narrowing of the negotiation set and moves the Nash solution 
downward, in favor (in dollar terms) of the taxpayer. In contrast, 
item (2) should move the Nash solution upward, in favor of the Revenue 
Service, especially if the taxpayer is risk averse. The penalty 
provision increases the taxpayer's expected cash outflow upon litigation 
as well as the variance of the probability distribution of the court 
decision. These conditions broaden the negotiation set by shifting 
the taxpayer's concession .limit upward and move the Nash value upward 
as well. 
In addition to limitations regarding equity and bargaining skill 
mentioned above, it should be noted that only a one-period model is 
considered herein. Behavioral incentives potentially arising from the 
possibility of repeated estate tax (or income tax) confrontations 
between the IRS and taxpayers are not addressed. Also, other abstrac-
tions are present, such as treatment of the IRS as a single person, 
compensated as a simple function of net revenues obtained, the use of 
of constant auditing and litigation costs, and modeling the court as an 
exogenous chance player. Removal of these restrictions might extend 
the study. In particular, research on optimal incentive contracts for 
Revenue Service agents and appeals officers and for tax practitioners 
could prove interesting and worthwhile. 
Empirical tests for the existence of the Nash solution in the 
taxpayer-IRS context might be beneficial to both the tax literature 
and the game theory literature. One avenue of such research involves 
studying data from actual out-of-court settlements. An alternative 
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or complementary approach is to conduct laboratory experiments to 
observe the behavior of subjects in an artifically formulated tax 
environment. As noted by Hamermesh (1973), the Nash solution is defined 
in utility space while empirical results are observable only in monetary 
terms. This makes empirical testing difficult to interpret. 
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